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Although team composition as an antecedent to team performance has been studied 
extensively, team composition as a dependent variable has been relatively neglected. Recent 
studies on team member selection assume that a group or an organization is conducting the 
process and propose elaborate models that include numerous factors along two dimensions: 
taskwork and teamwork. However, when individual decision makers are forming teams, they 
adopt a simpler heuristic approach that is based on their relational ties to potential team 
members. The extent of this relational bias, i.e., the proportion of the team to which they have 
prior relational ties, is explored in this dissertation.  
In cases where the decision maker was the team leader, the relational bias was 50% for top-
flight professional soccer players choosing their ideal teammates, and 34% for National Football 
League (NFL) head coaches choosing their coaching staff members. Even in cases where the 
decision maker was only the selector and not the team leader, the relational bias in the soccer 
player dataset was 31%. Whether the decision maker was a leader or only a selector was a 
statistically significant predictor of relational bias. These findings not only support the traditional 
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leadership theories that the leader-member relationship is a central dimension of leadership, but 
also suggest that relational ties might be important even at the team formation stage. 
The NFL head coaches dataset provides evidence that team leaders’ role interdependence is a 
statistically significant predictor of relational bias not only to the team as a whole, but also to the 
part of the team structure on which the leaders are more dependent (termed backing-up subunit).  
Content analysis of soccer players’ reports of their selections indicates that taskwork-related 
rationales were primary (58.2% of the total), followed by tie-related rationales (23%) and 
teamwork-related rationales (18.8%). Further, team spirit, a subcategory of teamwork-related 
rationales, comprised only 4.1% of the total rationales provided. The results suggest that when 
individual decision makers are forming teams, they utilize a three-dimensional (rather than two-
dimensional) approach that includes consideration of factors related to taskwork, teamwork, and 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
People often play a direct or indirect role in choosing their team members (Hinds, Carley, 
Krackhardt, & Wholey, 2000). Sometimes people select themselves to a group or committee, and 
at other times, the subject of this dissertation, people select others to form a team. Examples of 
the latter could be academics deciding whom to invite onto a research project team, or senior 
management appointing employees to a new product development team. 
Recently there has been a focus on selection in team settings and team formation, particularly 
in the industrial-organizational psychology and entrepreneurship research domains. Scholars in 
the former tradition attempt to extend the personnel selection approach to selection in team 
settings. They propose comprehensive models, utilizing techniques, such as structured interviews 
and situational judgment tests, that evaluate a number of factors, including personality attributes 
and knowledge, skills, abilities, and other factors (KSAOs) along the two dimensions of 
taskwork and teamwork. This approach requires adequate time, resources, and skills in using the 
selection tools and techniques, and by implication should be suitable in traditional organizational 
contexts when intra-organizational teams are being formed. Scholars in the latter tradition find 
that entrepreneurs tend to form teams that include friends and family, often without consideration 
of members’ capabilities to successfully launch a new business (Kamm & Nurick, 1993; Kamm, 
Shuman, Seeger, & Nurick, 1990).  
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Therefore the approach taken by entrepreneurs in practice appears to be at odds with the 
somewhat scientific approach suggested by the industrial-organizational psychologists. This 
dissertation addresses this issue. It proposes that because making decisions about who to put on a 
project or team is difficult and one of the biggest challenges facing a team leader (Reagans, 
Zuckerman, & McEvily, 2004), he or she adopts a simplified heuristic approach based on 
relational ties. This dissertation explores the decision maker’s relational approach with regard to 
who is selected onto the team and what factors underlie those selections. 
Individuals charged with forming a team typically develop a consideration set of potential 
team members by one or both of the following approaches: (1) an unbiased or open search 
(Aldrich, Carter, & Ruef, 2002), which implies casting the net as widely as possible; and (2) a 
relationally biased search based on familiarity (Aldrich et al., 2002; Hinds et al., 2000), 
involving a search from among those who are relationally tied to the decision maker, e.g., 
friends, family members, and former colleagues. The race for the Democratic Party nomination 
in the 2008 American Presidential election provides good examples of these two approaches to 
team formation. On one hand, Hillary Clinton’s campaign staff comprised those who had worked 
with her from her days as First Lady 15 years previously (Romano, 2007), which is an example 
of a relationally biased search process. On the other hand, Barack Obama appears to have 
adopted more of an open search process to team formation, because only two out of the 18 
members of his campaign staff were identified as having worked with him before (Sweet, 2007). 
The extent to which individuals select team members with whom they have prior relational ties is 
the overarching question explored in Study 1. 
In Study 2, I attempt to understand the factors that are salient or primary to decision makers 
when they are forming their teams. The literature on teams in general, and team formation in 
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particular, considers only two dimensions: taskwork and teamwork. However, in cases where the 
decision maker is an individual, a third dimension comes into play. This third dimension is the 
individual’s egocentrism, and is evidenced by the consideration of factors such as his or her 
relational ties or preferences, which may sometimes be idiosyncratic. Because the majority of 
these egocentric factors or rationales are accounted for by the decision maker’s relational ties, 
this factor is labeled tie related, and, coupled with the taskwork-related and teamwork-related 
factors, provides a more appropriate model of team formation as a result of individual decision 
making. 
These two studies attempt to respond to the call for more research on team composition as a 
dependent variable. Although team composition as an antecedent to team performance has been 
studied extensively, team composition as a dependent variable has been relatively neglected. 
Scholars across a range of disciplines, such as organizational behavior (Williams & O’Reilly, 
1998), social psychology (Levine & Moreland, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 2003), industrial-
organizational psychology (Morgeson, Reider, & Campion, 2005), entrepreneurship (Forbes, 
Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Sapienza, 2006), organization theory (Liang, 1994), and strategic 
management (Conger & Lawler, 2001), have called for more research into the drivers of team 
composition.  
As teams become the basic building block for many contemporary business organizations 
(Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995) and team leaders are given more power to select their team 
members, the research questions raised in this dissertation should increase in relevance. 
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2.0  THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Organizational behavior team research has largely focused on behavior in existing work 
teams, ignoring team formation (Forbes et al., 2006). Social psychologists Moreland and Levine 
state that team composition as a consequence has received less attention as an analytical 
perspective than has team composition as a cause or as a context (Levine & Moreland, 1998; 
Moreland & Levine, 2003). Although industrial-organizational psychologists have conducted 
vast research on personnel selection, there is relatively little empirical research on how to select 
individuals in team-based settings (Morgeson et al., 2005). Even in the entrepreneurship 
literature, theory specific to the process of entrepreneurial team formation is scant (Forbes et al., 
2006). In the strategy area, Conger and Lawler (2001) claim that the selection of board members 
has often been informal, and that only recently have firms started using more formal processes 
for selecting their directors. According to Liang (1994: 13), “we know little about how top 
management teams are constructed.” 
Teams and team-based organization structures are becoming increasingly prevalent, as 
evidenced by three trends. First, in traditional organizations, teams have become the basic unit 
through which work is carried out (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006; Gerard, 1995), and designing 
work around autonomous or semi-autonomous teams has become a fact of organizational life 
(Cascio, 1995; Hackman, 1990; Manz & Sims, 1993; Morgeson et al., 2005). Organizations are 
adopting new structural forms built around groups (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), and large, 
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permanent corporations are being transformed into flexible, temporary teams or networks of 
individuals (Mowshowitz, 1997). Second, advances in telecommunications technology are 
enabling globalization of operations and more fragmented organizational structures (Wong, 
DeSanctis, & Staudenmayer, 2007). Some scholars believe that project, virtual, or network 
organizations in which the organization is essentially an ad hoc team are now emerging as the 
logical form of organizing in general (Black & Edwards, 2000; DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998). 
Third, in recent years many organizations have begun life as an entrepreneurial team. The 
presence of entrepreneurial teams is a prominent economic reality, especially in high-tech 
industries (Chowdhury, 2005; Lechler, 2001).  
There are, broadly, two ways in which teams are formed: (1) either team members select 
themselves to the team, i.e., self-selection, or (2) team members are selected for a team by a 
decision maker, who may also be the team leader. 
Team formation in the former category has been extensively studied in the sociology and the 
social networks literature (Hinds et al., 2000; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). Ruef et al. (2003) 
identify five general mechanisms that may influence team formation: (1) homophily, i.e., 
selection based on similarity of ascriptive characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, and the like 
(e.g., Hinds et al., 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001); (2) functionality, i.e., the 
extent to which team members possess the achieved competencies to help ensure the success of a 
collectivity (e.g., Bales, 1953; Liang, 1994; Slater, 1955); (3) status expectations, i.e., the greater 
capacity of high-status individuals to attract other team members compared to low-status 
individuals; (4) network constraint, which implies that team formation occurs within a pre-
existing network of strong and weak ties that constrains the founding team’s choice of members; 
and (5) ecological constraint, which emphasizes the importance of spatial proximity and 
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environmental distribution of potential group members. Of these five mechanisms, the network 
constraint mechanism (Ruef et al., 2003), sometimes called familiarity (Hinds et al., 2000), 
involves social or relational ties, and has the most relevance to this dissertation. 
Team formation in the second category may be further divided into two categories, based on 
whether the decision maker, is (1) an individual, or (2) a group or an organization. Instances of 
the first case are typically non-organizational situations such as an entrepreneur forming his or 
her team, or an independent filmmaker selecting cast and crew. Instances of the second case are 
typically intra-organizational situations in which senior management selects employees to form, 
say, a new product development team or a task force.  
2.1 TEAM FORMATION : ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Industrial-organizational psychology scholars (e.g., Morgeson et al., 2005) have focused on 
team formation within traditional organizations. They approach team member selection from the  
personnel selection perspective and focus on the evaluation of an individual’s personality and 
KSAOs to predict effectiveness in team settings, sometimes called contextual performance 
(Morgeson et al., 2005).  
According to Morgeson et al. (2005: 586), “Research on contextual performance has 
suggested that personality characteristics are likely to be particularly good predictors of 
contextual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994; Van 
Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996).” Meta-analytic research studies have found that personality 
characteristics such as conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability are 
positively related to different aspects of contextual performance (Hogan & Holland, 2003; 
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Hough, 1992; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Organ & Ryan, 1995; Peeters, Van Tuijl, Rutte, & 
Reyman, 2006).  
Another research stream has focused on knowledge, skills, and abilities, rather than on 
personality, as predictors of performance in team settings. One of the earliest efforts in this 
direction was by Stevens and Campion (1994), who developed a Knowledge, Skills, and Ability 
(KSA) Requirements for Teamwork model. The KSA for teamwork model encompasses two 
categories: (1) interpersonal KSAs, and (2) self-management KSAs. Based on this model, 
Stevens and Campion (1999) subsequently developed a selection test for teamwork settings.  
In recent years, these two research streams on team member selection, namely, personality 
and KSAOs, have merged, resulting in comprehensive selection models. In the context of 
specialized military teams, Goodwin (1999) examined the relationship of 15 predictor variables 
to overall mission success. His variables included four personality characteristics (which he 
classified as teamwork-generic), five taskwork-generic abilities (e.g., cognitive and spatial 
ability, physical strength and stamina), three teamwork-specific aspects (effort/persistence, 
interpersonal skills, and leadership), and three taskwork-specific skills (e.g., small-unit tactical 
skills, land navigation skills). In a similar vein, Morgeson and colleagues, using data collected in 
a Midwest mill of a national steel corporation, examined the relationship between contextual 
performance and predictors such as personality variables, social skills, and teamwork knowledge 
(Morgeson et al., 2005).  
Implicit in all the aforementioned approaches from the industrial-organizational psychology 
tradition is that these teams are being formed within an organizational context, and the 
organization (be it the military or a national steel corporation) has the time, resources, and skills 
in utilizing selection tools and techniques to conduct such evaluations. In fact, Morgeson et al. 
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(2005) examined whether three of the most commonly used selection techniques for hiring into 
traditional settings, i.e., a structured interview, a personality test, and a situational judgment test, 
would be effective for hiring individuals into team settings. They found that social skills as 
measured by a structured interview, four personality characteristics as measured by the 
personality test, and teamwork knowledge as measured by a situational judgment test all 
predicted contextual performance. 
2.2 TEAM FORMATION: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING 
When individual decision makers form teams in non-organizational contexts (e.g., 
entrepreneurial teams), they usually have neither the resources nor the opportunity to conduct the 
type of evaluations of potential team members that are proposed by the industrial-organizational 
psychologists. As Lechler (2001: 263) notes, “People who are founding and developing new 
ventures are confronted with a great variety of challenges deriving mainly from business and 
technological uncertainty.” Further, unlike the organizational context, the consideration set of 
potential team members is not defined by organizational boundaries. Thus it is not surprising that 
entrepreneurial collaboration is often embedded in existing social and personal relationships with 
friends, work colleagues, family, or sexual partners (Birley, 1985; Larson & Starr, 1993; Quince, 
2001). According to Kamm and colleagues, many entrepreneurial teams consist of friends, 
relatives, or associates from former employers or educational institutions, indicating that they 
emerge from existing relationships, often without consideration of members’ capabilities to 
successfully launch a new business (Kamm et al., 1990; Kamm & Nurick, 1993). 
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Team Formation as a result of
Organizational Decision Making Individual Decision Making
Research domain Industrial-organizational psychology Entrepreneurship, Leadership
t Traditional organizations New organizations/ start-ups, new organizational forms 
s of teams Intra-organizational project teams, task forces, committees
Entrepreneurial teams, project 
organizations, network organizations
ion making entity Usually a group of senior managers or executives
Usually an individual e.g. entrepreneur, 
project team leader
ideration set of potential team 
bers
Usually defined by organizational 
boundaries Usually not well defined
h process Structured process Unstructured process
nsions considered Taskwork, Teamwork Task orientation, People or Relational Orientation
rs considered Individuals' personalities, knowledge, skills, abilities, other characteristics
Ability to contribute to team goal, ties to 
decision maker
uation process
Usually formal, systematic, involving 
techniques such as structured 
inteviews, personality tests, situational 
judgment tests
Usually informal, intuitive, and may or 
may not involve an interview
urces available to conduct 
tion process
Usually abundant (e.g., time, training in 
selection tools/techniques) Usually scarce














 to adopt heuristics processing Low HighNeed
The position advanced in this dissertation is that the phenomenon observed by the 
entrepreneurship scholars, namely, the seemingly suboptimal selection of team members who 
have relational ties to the decision maker, is merely a specific instance of a general heuristic-
oriented approach taken by individual decision makers when tasked with forming teams. The 
comparison between team formation through organizational decision making and through 
individual decision making is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Team formation: Organizational decision making versus individual decision making  
 
 
From Table 1, it appears that team formation through individual decision making is a 
complex task (c.f. Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Individuals, however, are “cognitive misers” 
(Taylor, 1991; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999), who, under circumstances of “unavailability or 
indeterminacy of important information” (Taylor, 1991: 195), select short cuts or heuristics to fill 
in the blanks in knowledge (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999). Drawing from the sociology and social 
networks literature (Hinds et al., 2000; Ruef et al., 2003), individual decision makers might 
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simplify their team formation process by only considering those who are similar to them 
(homophily mechanism), or by searching for talent in their spatial proximity (ecological 
constraint mechanism), or by searching within their social network (network constraint or 
familiarity mechanism). Although scholars have found empirical support for all these 
mechanisms, as well as others (such as functionality or status expectations), in this dissertation 
the focus is on the relational approach, which is akin to the network constraint or familiarity 
mechanism. 
The leadership literature provides the basis for the focus on the relational approach to team 
formation. When an individual decision maker is tasked with forming his or her team, he or she 
is ipso facto the leader of the team. That the individual entrepreneur is termed the lead 
entrepreneur after the entrepreneurial team is formed signifies the leadership role that he or she 
plays or is expected to play with regard to the team. Relational or people orientation has long 
been considered a fundamental dimension of leadership (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz & 
Kahn, 1952). According to Uhl-Bien (2006), traditional research on leadership examines 
behavioral styles that are relationship oriented (Likert, 1961). And again, the dominant models in 
the leadership literature focus on the leader-follower dyadic relationship (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, 
& Xiao, 2006). 
The use of a relational heuristic approach in forming teams is explored in two studies in this 
dissertation. Study 1 explores the question: to what extent do decision makers use relational ties 
in forming their teams? The key dependent variable in this study is relational bias to the team, or 
the proportion of the selected team that has a prior relational tie (e.g., family, former colleague, 
friend) with the decision maker. Study 2 explores the question: to what extent do decision 
makers’ selection rationales betray a relational orientation? In this study, decision makers’ 
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selection rationales are content analyzed and categorized, and the three categories thus formed, 
i.e., taskwork related, teamwork related, and tie related, constitute the dependent variables. 
At one extreme, decision makers could select a majority of their team, if not the entire team, 
on a relational basis, and at the other extreme, they could form their team with few or none of the 
members having prior relational ties to them. Research finds that both approaches have their 
advantages. Beckman (2006) found that firms with founding teams whose members have worked 
at the same company engaged in exploitation, or efficiency-oriented (March, 1991) behaviors, 
whereas those whose founding teams had worked at many different companies had unique ideas 
and contacts that led to exploration or innovation (March, 1991).  
Research has identified many benefits of intra-team relational ties. Kroll, Walters, and Le 
(2007) found that boards of young firms that have recently gone public are best comprised of a 
majority of the original team members, rather than independent outsiders, because they possess 
valuable tacit knowledge. The level of transactive memory (c.f. Wegner, 1986) was higher for 
groups whose members were trained together compared to groups whose members were trained 
individually (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland Argote, & Krishnan, 1998). Scholars 
have argued that repeated interaction among individuals develops interpersonal trust as the 
values and objectives of the parties become mutually understood and intertwined (Butler, 1991; 
Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004; Uzzi, 1999).  
Although more relational ties could lead to more trust and cohesiveness, these latter could 
have negative consequences. According to Langfred (2004), teams that are high in cohesiveness 
and trust can exert a powerful influence on individuals to conform (Baron, Vandello, & 
Brunsman, 1996), and such teams are also especially susceptible to group decision biases like 
“groupthink” (Janis, 1982). Langfred (2004) found that a high level of trust among members of a 
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work team can make them reluctant to monitor one another. At an individual level, cohesive ties 
amplify the pressure to reciprocate past favors (Krackhardt, 1999), and breed rigidity (Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 2003). Examining the relationship between the extent of relational ties within the 
team and the team’s effectiveness and performance is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but is 
a topic for future research. 
In both studies, the relationship between the same three independent variables is examined 
with regard to the respective dependent variables. The three independent variables are: (1) 
decision task demand, which operationalizes either a leader condition or a selector condition; (2) 
individualism-collectivism, an individual differences variable based on national cultural values; 
and (3) decision maker’s role interdependence, specifically, whether the role is more or less  
independent or critical. 
2.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(a) Decision task demand: Leader versus Selector condition 
Although this dissertation analyzes archival data, the first independent variable, decision task 
demands, is similar to an experimental research design, with a control and experimental group. 
Decision task demand operationalizes two conditions: (1) decision makers are merely the 
selectors, and are selecting team members who would perform the task without their 
involvement; and (2) decision makers are also the leaders of the team, and are choosing 
teammates. The former is similar to a control condition, whereas the latter is similar to an 
experimental condition. If forming teams on a relational basis is a characteristic of leadership, 
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then the decision makers in the latter category should be significantly different compared to 
those in the former category with regard to dependent variables that measure the relational 
approach to team formation. In a sense, this variable is analogous to a manipulation check in lab 
experiments. 
In lab experiments, instructions by experimenters can set goals for subjects (Devine, 
Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Neuberg, 1989; Pavelchek, 1989), and different goals 
stimulate different response patterns of cognition, leading decision makers to approach ill-
structured situations with different concerns (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Indeed, research has 
found that observational goals, i.e., identification of either “the most important problem” or “all 
of the important problems,” had significant effects on how subjects responded (Beyer, 
Chattopadhyay, George, Glick, Olgilvie, & Pugliese, 1997). Similarly, I expect the different 
experimental goals of “selecting your team” versus “selecting a team” to have a significant effect 
on the extent to which relational ties are used, or are salient, in team formation. 
(b) Individualism-Collectivism 
There has been growing interest in understanding the influence of culture and cultural 
differences in how people feel, think, and behave (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Studies with a focus 
on national-cultural differences assume that these have a strong influence on individual values 
and worldviews (Markóczy, 2000). Research has found support for cultural differences affecting 
work-related values, worldviews, beliefs, and behaviors of organizational members (e.g., 
Geletkanycz, 1997). According to Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn (2001), cross-cultural research has 
established that national culture explains between 25% and 50% of variation in attitudes 
(Gannon et al., 1994), and is also related to decision-making and leadership behaviors (Hofstede, 
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1980; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991; Shane, 1994). Schneider and De Meyer (1991) found that 
culture influenced interpretation and response to strategic issues. 
 Although Hofstede (1980) introduced individualism-collectivism as a cultural-level variable, 
in recent years several studies (Clugston, Howell, & Dorfman, 2000; Ramamoorthy & Flood, 
2002 & 2004; Wagner, 1995) have treated it as an individual difference variable. In fact, 
according to Eby and Dobbins (1997), collectivistic orientation is an individual difference 
variable that has received very little attention but may be central to understanding how 
individuals respond to working in teams and team-based organizations. 
Hofstede (2001) identified five independent dimensions of national culture differences, each 
rooted in a basic problem with which all societies have to cope: (1) power distance, which is 
related to the basic problem of human inequality; (2) uncertainty avoidance, which is related to 
the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future; (3) individualism versus 
collectivism, which is related to the integration of individuals into primary groups; (4) 
masculinity versus femininity, which is related to the division of emotional roles between men 
and women; and (5) long-term versus short-term orientation, which is related to the choice of 
focus for people’s efforts: the future or the present. 
Of these, the individualism-collectivism dimension is the most relevant for this dissertation, 
because it reflects the pattern of responses with which individuals relate to their groups (Earley 
& Gibson, 1998). Individualism is the condition in which personal interests are prioritized over 
the needs of groups (Wagner, 1995; Wagner & Moch, 1986). “Collectivism is an orientation 
toward person-group relationships in which such relationships are looked at as being far more 
permanent and central” (Wagner, 1995: 154). According to Van Dyne and colleagues (Van 
Dyne, Vandewalle, Kostova, Latham, & Cummings, 2000), researchers have examined 
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collectivistic tendency as a within-culture individual difference with significant implications for 
cooperation in groups (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991; Moorman 
& Blakely, 1995; Wagner, 1995). With regard to leadership, Gibson (1995) found that behaviors 
that defined a particular style of leadership differed across individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures (Gibson & Marcoulides, 1995). 
(c) Individual role interdependence 
Although the term role interdependence was introduced over 50 years ago (Thomas, 1957), it 
has received little scholarly attention. However, there have been a variety of related concepts in 
the groups and teams literature that overlap to varying degrees with Thomas’ (1957) 
conceptualization of role interdependence, and will be drawn upon in defining and 
operationalizing the term and developing the hypotheses. These concepts include individual task 
interdependence (Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2001), initiated and received task 
interdependence (Kiggundu, 1983), goal interdependence (Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert, & 
Oosterhof, 2003), and the individual goal condition in groups research (e.g., Mitchell & Silver 
1990). 
Work that is assigned to teams is further divided among individuals, and this division of 
labor creates different roles (Van der Vegt et al., 2003). This division results in different patterns 
of task interdependence among individual group members occupying different roles and 
performing differentiated tasks (Brass, 1981; Van der Vegt, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 2001). 
Because of the division of labor inherent in the flow of work, certain positions within teams may 
have more influence on team performance (Pearsall & Ellis, 2006: 576). Critical team members 
occupy roles within the team which involve the control of vital information or resources, and 
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therefore all other positions are dependent on them (Pearson & Ellis, 2006). Therefore, critical 
team members have structural sources of power (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). This creates power 
asymmetries between critical team members (lower individual role interdependence) and 
noncritical team members (greater individual role interdependence), and these may result in 
different perceptions with regard to teamwork and different approaches to team formation. 
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN OVERVIEW 
Both datasets in this dissertation utilize archival data that have been compiled from the public 
domain, in this case the Internet. This is unlike typical research on decision making and biases 
that is usually conducted in experimental laboratory settings. This approach complements the 
experimental approach. It addresses to some extent the concern that because most groups 
research has involved concocted groups in the laboratory, it is not absolutely certain that 
inferences about natural groups can be based on it (Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993; Guzzo & 
Shea, 1992).  
The research design adopted in this dissertation affords three advantages over the 
experimental approach. First, unlike in most lab experiments, the measures are unobtrusive; i.e., 
the subjects were not aware that their selection decisions and rationales would be compiled and 
analyzed, thereby minimizing, if not eliminating, demand effects. Second, in both datasets, the 
subjects not only are professionals in their respective fields, but also are recognized as having 
reached the top of their professions. All the soccer players in the first dataset have played for 
their national team, which is the highest level to which an athlete can aspire. Most of them play 
professionally in the top European soccer leagues (e.g., the English Premier League, the Spanish 
La Liga, and the German Bundesliga), and many are household names in countries that follow 
soccer. The second dataset comprises National Football League (NFL) head coaches.  In the 
American football coaching profession, becoming a head coach in the NFL is the highest 
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position to which one can aspire. A list of the soccer players and NFL head coaches who 
comprise dataset 1 and dataset 2 is provided in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. It 
would be well nigh impossible to conduct lab research with such high-profile subjects. Third, the 
total sample size of 135 decision makers/teams (56 in the first dataset and 79 in the second 
dataset) is relatively large for groups research conducted in the laboratory. 
Both datasets in this dissertation are sports related. Sports have been considered a useful 
context not only in academic research in general, but also with regard to teams research and team 
composition in particular. Sports team members play different positions, are interdependent, and 
must work together closely. Sports are thus a relevant context to study workplace teams (Katz, 
2001).  
Sports contexts are particularly relevant for studying team composition for four reasons. 
First, in comparison to organizational settings, teams are well defined. Of the 12 collocated and 
12 geographically distributed teams that Mortensen and Hinds (2002) studied, for example, no 
team was in complete agreement about its own membership. In both datasets, there is no 
ambiguity about who comprises the team. Second, the composition of sports teams is changed 
more frequently than in traditional organizational contexts, resulting in larger sample sizes. 
Third, demographic data about the team members, which are usually difficult to obtain in 
organizational contexts, are publicly available not only through the team’s official Web site, but 
also through other public Web sites such as www.wikpedia.org. Fourth, because contextual and 
environmental factors that might affect who wins and who loses are held constant, team 
composition may control the outcome to a greater extent in sports contexts than it does in other 
contexts (Jones, 1974). Jones (1974) studied group effectiveness as a function of individual or 
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subgroup effectiveness in four highly competitive sports (tennis, football, baseball, and 
basketball) and found strong positive correlations in all four cases. 
Although there are differences between sports teams and work teams, Kamm et al. (1990) 
believe that descriptions of how teams such as political cabinets and athletic teams are assembled 
are germane to the understanding of how entrepreneurial teams are formed. 
Research using sports teams and coaches has been featured in prominent scholarly journals, 
including the Academy of Management Journal (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Latham & 
Stewart, 1981), Administrative Science Quarterly (Adler & Adler, 1988), American Sociological 
Review (Fine, 1979), Journal of Applied Psychology (Dirks, 2000; Totterdell, 2000), Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin (Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Watson, Chemers, & Preiser, 2001) and 
Small Group Research (Spink, Nickel, Wilson, & Odnokon, 2005; Turman, 2001).  
Further, team sports such as soccer and football have become big business (Boon & 
Sierksma, 2003). Thus, not surprisingly, the practitioner-oriented scholarly literature has also 
attempted to draw lessons from sports that managers in more traditional organizations can learn 
from, e.g., Academy of Management Executive (Fagenson-Eland, 2001; Katz, 2001) and Business 
Strategy Review (Dell’Osso & Szymanski, 1991). Of particular relevance to the subject of 
decision making in sports contexts are recently published books like Moneyball (Lewis, 2003), 
and The Paolantonio Report: The Most Overrated & Underrated Players, Teams, Coaches, and 
Moments in NFL History (Paolantonio, 2007). 
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3.1 SOCCER PLAYER DATASET 
The first dataset consists of top-flight soccer players and either their choice of ideal 
teammates or their selection of their fantasy teams. In the first case, the soccer player making the 
choices is the ipso facto leader of the team, whereas in the second case, the player making the 
selections is merely the selector of the team and is neither a teammate nor the leader of the team. 
Although this dataset has been compiled from archival sources, it bears two similarities to an 
experimental design. First, although the decision makers are professional soccer players in real 
life, the teams they form are not composed in reality. Thus, the players are unconstrained in their 
decision making. They can form their teams either with fellow professional players—from those 
who are currently active or from the past (some of whom may be legends of the sport)—or with 
friends and family members. They are also not constrained by the availability of their most 
preferred picks, because the same player can be simultaneously chosen or selected by multiple 
decision makers. Second, the dataset comprises two subsamples, leaders choosing their 
teammates and selectors selecting their team members, in which the former functions like the 
experimental condition and the latter like the control condition, with regard to whether being the 
designated leader leads to increased relational orientation in team formation.  
Although the terms “fantasy sports” and “fantasy leagues” are associated with laypeople 
playing the role of team selector, in this dataset the decision makers are professional players 
themselves, who belong to the same talent pool and who are peers or colleagues of those being 
considered and picked. Thus, unlike laypeople’s choices, these decision makers potentially have 
relational ties (e.g., membership in the same professional or national soccer team) with those 
they are considering or including on their teams. The potential for relational ties makes this 
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team-formation scenario analogous to other organizational situations (e.g., internal labor 
markets) or non-organizational situations (e.g., professions such as filmmaking).  
However, a key disadvantage of the soccer player dataset is that there are no direct financial 
stakes involved, and decision makers are not penalized if they make obviously suboptimal or 
idiosyncratic decisions. This concern is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the soccer players 
are well known and their selections are not only meant to be public, but also meant to be viewed 
and scrutinized by their fans, whom they would not like to alienate, and therefore there could be 
indirect financial stakes.  
3.2 NFL COACHES DATASET 
This dataset comprises the first-year coaching rosters of 79 NFL head coaches. Most studies 
of sports coaches and coaching deal with the dynamics between the coaches and the players (e.g., 
Dirks, 2000). In this dissertation, however, it is the head coach and the selection of his coaching 
staff that are investigated. The sports coaching profession in general, and coaching in the NFL in 
particular, provides an excellent context in which to study the relational approach to team 
formation. In a personal phone interview with Ken Whisenhunt, head coach of the Arizona 
Cardinals, an NFL club, he said, “You hire who you know. If you don’t know them directly, you 
take the opinion of someone you trust.” (A summary of the interview with Coach Whisenhunt is 
provided in Appendix C.) According to Dan Rooney, chairman, Pittsburgh Steelers, “sometimes 
young, new head coaches have to hire people they know from before, because others are not 
willing to take the risk to join them. They expect new coaches, especially if they are young … to 
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get fired quickly, and they don’t want to risk their jobs.” (A summary of my interview with Mr. 
Rooney is provided in Appendix D.) 
This dataset was compiled in order to complement the soccer player dataset. Unlike the 
soccer player dataset, the teams in this dataset have existed, or currently exist, in real life and 
there are high financial and reputational stakes. The NFL has the highest per-game attendance of 
any domestic professional sports league in the world, drawing over 67,000 spectators per game 
for each of its two most recently completed seasons, 2006 and 2007. The television rights to the 
NFL are the most lucrative and expensive rights not only of any American sport, but also of any 
American entertainment property.  
In the NFL, each of the 32 head coaches is clearly the leader of the core (players and 
coaches) of his respective organization, and is held responsible for the on-field success or failure 
of the team. This has resulted in relatively short average tenures for NFL head coaches. 
According to analysis of league records by Challenger, Gray, and Christmas, Inc., in the 82-year 
history of the NFL, the average coaching tenure is just 4.3 years or seasons. Further, the length 
of the average coaching tenure has been decreasing. In the 1980 season, NFL coaches had been 
with their current teams an average of 4.61 seasons, whereas in 2003, the contingent of head 
coaches had logged just 2.75 seasons of experience with their respective organizations 
(Pasquarelli, 2003). Because a newly appointed NFL head coach inherits most of the players and 
does not have a lot of flexibility in making player roster changes, the key variable that he can 
manipulate to achieve results is his choice of assistant coaches. This underscores the importance 
of, and the real financial stakes involved in, his choice of assistants and the formation of his 
coaching staff. 
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However, the real-world nature of the NFL head coach dataset has another important 
difference vis-à-vis the soccer player dataset. Unlike the soccer player dataset, in the NFL 
dataset, the coaching staff members are not necessarily the decision maker’s first choices, but 
rather those who accepted the position. The data regarding those who were originally selected 
but were either unable or unwilling to join are not available, and one cannot ascertain how many 
of the head coaches’ selections were also their first choices. Because of this feature of the 
dataset, its results could be more generalizable to other real-world contexts in which selection is 
constrained by the willingness and ability of the selectee to join the team. 
3.3 SUMMARY 
The two datasets afford the opportunity not only to answer different questions, but also to 
triangulate some findings. Both datasets are utilized to investigate relational bias (Study 1) with 
regard to the team and to the backing-up subunit. The relationship between individual role 
interdependence and the two measures of relational bias is examined in both datasets. Because 
the selection rationales are available only for the soccer player dataset, it is the only one utilized 
for Study 2. 
In both datasets, the decision makers’ amount and diversity of experience are not only 
available, but also controlled for. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for controlling 
for decision makers’ experience. From a practical point of view, it is reasonable to expect that 
more experienced decision makers would have had more opportunity to form professional ties 
compared to less experienced decision makers. From a theoretical point of view, decision makers 
who are more experienced could also have greater expertise compared to those who are less 
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experienced, and research has found that experts differ significantly from novices with regard to 
problem solving and decision making  (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Day & Lord, 1992).  
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4.0  STUDY 1: DECISION MAKERS’ RELATIONAL BIAS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Forming a team in a non-intraorganizational context is a form of nonroutine decision making. 
In nonroutine decision making, searching for and dealing with new information plays a central 
role (Janis & Mann, 1977; Schultz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). An entrepreneur 
forming his or her entrepreneurial team is a typical example of nonroutine decision making with 
regard to team member selection. 
Entrepreneurship scholars distinguish between two general approaches to team formation: (1) 
a rational process driven by economic, instrumental considerations, and (2) a boundedly rational 
process driven by interpersonal attraction, homophily, or social network considerations (Aldrich 
et al., 2002; Forbes et al., 2006). 
The former perspective suggests that founders will engage in an open search, using the 
fundamental criterion of what a potential team member can add to the venture (Aldrich et al., 
2002; Mosakowski, 1998). Sandberg (1992) speculated that founders assemble entrepreneurial 
teams as a means of “filling the gaps” in their competencies (Forbes et al., 2006). In a similar 
vein, team formation decision-making models have been proposed whereby the team members 
are sought based on the perceived needs of the team (Kamm & Nurick, 1993; Larson & Starr, 
1993; Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, & Westhead, 2003). 
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The latter perspective is rooted in the social psychological needs of existing team members 
(Forbes et al., 2006) and posits the operation of mechanisms such as homophily and network 
constraint. Ruef et al. (2003) found strong support for the homophily mechanism, particularly 
with regard to similarity of gender, ethnicity, and occupation. Research has also found that when 
selecting future team members individuals are biased toward others of the same race, and those 
with whom they have developed strong working relationships in the past (Hinds et al., 2000). 
Even though those selected on a relational basis may be as competent as those selected on a 
more open search basis (Forbes et al., 2006), the entrepreneurship literature appears to suggest 
that selections through relational ties are departures from rationality. For instance, although 
Kamm and Nurick (1993) posit an intendedly rational search process, entrepreneurs’ responses 
to the question of how they decided who would make a good new venture partner or team 
member suggest that interpersonal attraction and not instrumental considerations may be 
operating. According to Francis and Sandberg (2000), although affective motives may produce 
resources or team memberships that could not otherwise be attained, friendship as a basis for 
team selection is deemed inferior to selection based on filling gaps in the team’s capabilities 
(Timmons, 1979). The question of whether those selectees who have relational ties to the 
decision maker are as competent as those who do not, or those who were available but not 
selected, is outside the scope of this dissertation, and can be explored in future research. This 
study explores the extent to which one of the mechanisms in the social psychological 
perspective, namely, the relational approach, is used by decision makers to form their teams.   
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4.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES (DV) 
(a) DV1: Relational bias to the team 
The term relational bias represents an attempt to develop a measure of a decision maker’s 
propensity to select individuals with whom he or she already has a relational tie. A relational tie 
exists between a decision maker and a selected team member if they are friends, family 
members, former teammates, or colleagues. The relational bias to the team is the proportion of a 
team that has a prior relational tie with the decision maker. This approach is similar to other 
studies on team composition that measure the proportion of team members on a particular 
attribute. For instance, Eby and Dobbins (1997) define team collectivistic composition as the 
proportion of team members with a high collectivistic orientation. 
(b) DV2: Relational bias to the backing-up subunit 
In this dissertation, backing-up subunit is defined as that part or subunit of the team that 
supports the decision maker’s role performance, and on which, therefore, he or she is more 
dependent upon compared to other parts or subunits of the team.  
The backing-up subunit is related to the concept of task interdependence, which is at the core 
of the definition of teams. Interdependence is often the reason a team is formed in the first place 
(Campion et al., 1993). Task interdependence is a structural feature of the relationships between 
team members and stems from tasks within the teams (Van der Vegt et al., 2003). According to 
Ramamoorthy and Flood (2004), the level of task interdependence may be determined by the 
way in which people work together (Shea & Guzzo, 1987), and may be determined partly by 
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technology and partly by the way in which the work is organized (Van Vijfeijken, Kleingeld, 
Van Tuijl, Algera, & Thierry, 2002).  
Team tasks can vary in terms of their interdependency, and this has implications for selection 
and composition (Arthur, Edwards, Bell, & Villado, 2005). There may be greater or lesser task 
interdependence among team members depending on how the work is organized, and the degree 
of interdependency may have an effect on the behavior of individuals (Ramamoorthy & Flood, 
2004). This implies that the decision makers’ task-related background and experience may, first, 
determine on which part of the team structure they are more dependent (i.e., their backing-up 
subunit), and second, cause them to adopt a different (i.e., more relational) approach to selection 
for that subunit compared to the rest of the team structure.  
The term backing-up subunit is derived from the concept of backing-up behavior (McIntyre 
& Salas, 1995; Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Ellis, West, & Moon, 2003). Backing-up behavior has 
been defined as “the discretionary provision of resources and task-related effort to another 
member of one’s team that is intended to help that team member obtain the goals as defined by 
his or her role when it is apparent that the team member is failing to reach those goals” (Porter et 
al., 2003: 391). However, in order to effectively engage in backing-up behaviors, team members 
must be both able and willing to provide assistance (Porter et al., 2003). The ability to back up 
another team member’s role is constrained by the position of that role in the team structure. If the 
two roles (the one needing assistance, and the other providing the backing-up behavior) are 
located in the same subunit of the team structure, it is more likely that the backing-up behavior 
can be effected, compared to a situation in which the roles are located in different subunits of the 
team structure. Thus, the conceptualization of the backing-up subunit that is developed in this 
dissertation is the structural counterpart of the backing-up behavior construct. 
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The relational bias to the backing-up subunit is the proportion of the backing-up subunit that 
has a prior relational tie with the decision maker. 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Decision task demand: Leader versus Selector condition 
I draw on two research streams to develop my hypotheses in this section. The first stream is 
the leadership literature, which emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the leader 
and the team members. The second stream is the decision-making literature, in which one of the 
fundamental issues is the difference between a choice task and a judgment task. 
The soccer player dataset affords the opportunity to compare team formation decision 
making under two conditions: (1) the decision maker is asked to select a team, one in which he 
would have no further role, and (2) the decision maker is asked to select his teammates, which 
not only implies that he would be actively involved in the team, but also cues that he is the leader 
of the team.   
The leadership literature in general, and the team or managerial leadership literature in 
particular, has traditionally emphasized the fundamental importance of the leader’s relationship 
with the followers or team members. In the managerial leadership literature, two-factor models 
have dominated (Shipper & Davy, 2002) and the two factors or dimensions are the leader’s task 
orientation or concern for production and people orientation or concern for people (e.g., Blake 
& Mouton, 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1952). The people-orientation dimension emphasizes the 
relationship between the leader and the team members. The leader-follower dyadic relationship 
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is the focus of the dominant models in the leadership literature (Klein et al., 2006). According to 
Uhl-Bien (2006), traditional research on leadership has examined behavioral styles that are 
relationship oriented (Likert, 1961). If this is indeed a fundamental dimension of leadership, it 
should be activated at the outset, when the leader is forming the team. Consequently, relational 
considerations should be more salient to leaders than to selectors, and the former should have 
higher relational bias to their teams compared to the latter. 
Individual decision makers in the selector condition are performing a judgment task, whereas 
those in the leader condition are choosing teammates, which is a choice task. Understanding the 
difference between judgment and choice tasks is a central concern of decision-making research 
(Sood & Forehand, 2005). Research that has investigated the process-oriented differences 
between choice and judgment has found support for the notion that the former often involves 
simplifying heuristics, where individuals focus on a subset of the available information, whereas 
the latter often involves holistic processes, where individuals examine a more complete set of 
information (Billings & Scherer, 1988; Schkade & Johnson, 1989; Senter & Wedell, 1999; 
Wedell & Senter, 1997). Compared to choice, judgment is predicted to lead to more information 
searched and a greater amount of interdimensional search (Billings & Scherer, 1988). This 
suggests that decision makers in the selector condition would scan a wider consideration set, or, 
in other words, be less constrained by network or relational ties, compared to those in the leader 
condition. 
H1A: Decision makers in the leader condition would have higher relational bias to their 
teams compared to those in the selector condition. 
In the leader condition, the decision makers are in reality dependent on the backing-up 
subunit, whereas in the selector condition decision makers are not dependent on the backing-up 
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subunit, because they are not part of the team. Those in the selector condition may be dependent 
on the team as a whole, if the team’s performance reflects on them and their ability, but they are 
not especially dependent on the backing-up subunit. Therefore, those in the leader condition are 
expected to have higher relational bias to their backing-up subunit compared to those in the 
selector condition. 
There is evidence that the impact of relationship conflict may be exacerbated when team 
members must work closely together in order to be successful (Duffy, Shaw, & Stark, 2000; 
Gladstein, 1984). In the leader condition, in order to guard against the possibility of relationship 
conflict with those on whom they are more interdependent, decision makers are more likely to 
choose based on relational ties. In the selector condition, this would not necessarily be the case, 
because the decision maker is not expected to be part of the team. Therefore, once again, those in 
the leader condition are expected to have higher relational bias to the backing-up subunit 
compared to those in the selector condition. 
H1B: Decision makers in the leader condition would have higher relational bias to their 
backing-up subunits compared to those in the selector condition. 
(b) Individualism-Collectivism 
Individualism and collectivism are often equated with independent versus interdependent, 
and separate versus relational self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Kashima, Yamaguchi, 
Kim, Choi, Gelfand, & Yuki, 1995). Individual differences in self-construal may contribute to 
divergent orientations to relationships (Cross & Morris, 2003). Individuals who have defined 
themselves in terms of close relationships will behave so as to maintain harmonious and close 
relationships with important others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000). Cross et al. (2000) found 
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that individuals who were high on interdependent self-construal were more likely to consider the 
needs and wishes of close others when making an important decision. This implies that decision 
makers from more collectivistic cultures, who have greater interdependent self-construal, would 
have more relational ties in their teams than those from more individualistic cultures. 
Whereas people in individualistic cultures tend to strive for autonomy, in collectivistic 
cultures people are likely to be attached to a few groups, whose goals are all-important, and 
which are major influences in defining their identity (Watkins et al., 1998). Collectivism in 
general, and horizontal collectivism in particular, is a cultural pattern in which the individual 
sees the self as an aspect of ingroups (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) such as 
family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers (Hui, 1988). This implies that individuals from 
collectivistic cultures would be more likely to consider their ingroups in the process of forming 
their teams, and their selected teams would have higher relational bias than those from 
individualistic cultures.  
People in individualistic cultures are very good at meeting outsiders, forming new ingroups, 
and getting along with new people (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). This 
suggests that they would be less likely to select on a relational basis. Also, Ramamoorthy and 
Flood (2004) found that lack of collectivistic orientation was negatively related to team loyalty, 
implying that individualistic decision makers may be less inclined to select former teammates 
based on loyalty considerations.  
H2A: Decision makers from individualistic cultures would have lower relational bias to their 
teams compared to those from collectivistic cultures. 
Because the decision maker is by definition highly dependent on the backing-up subunit, 
having trust in the selectees in this unit would be vital. Individualists prefer cognitive bases of 
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trust such as cues of performance behaviors and accomplishments, whereas collectivists prefer 
affect-based trust that indicates a social-emotional bond that goes beyond task activities and 
professional relationships to extra-role and relational goodwill. This suggests that when selecting 
team members for their backing-up subunit, individualists may select based on skills and 
abilities, whereas collectivists may select based on relational ties. Two studies by Huff and 
Kelley (2003, 2005) found that people from collectivistic cultures express less trust in outgroups 
and thus may select members of their ingroup, such as former coworkers or family members, to 
positions in their backing-up subunit. 
H2B: Decision makers from individualistic cultures would have lower relational bias to their 
backing-up subunits compared to those who are from collectivistic cultures. 
(c) Individual role interdependence 
Individuals occupying roles high on initiated task interdependence would experience a high 
sense of responsibility in relation to those whose jobs are being facilitated (Horsfall & 
Arensburg, 1966; Kiggundu, 1983). They are therefore likely to adopt a more instrumental 
approach to team formation, and have lower relational bias to their teams, compared to those 
with received task interdependence. 
Teams or subunits of teams operating under high structural task interdependence tend to 
experience strong interpersonal attraction (Johnson & Johnson, 1989) and to develop strong 
interpersonal relationships (Johnson & Johnson, 1980). This implies that decision makers whose 
roles have been part of subunits with greater interdependence are likely to have strong relational 
orientation and have a higher relational bias to their teams compared to other decision makers.  
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Some team-members occupy roles that have greater criticality or task centrality compared to 
others (Brass, 1984; 522). Critical team members “act as go-betweens, bridging the ‘structural 
holes’ between disconnected others, facilitating resource flows” (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001; 
121), and exhibit little overlap with the roles of his or her teammates (Brass, 1985). Decision 
makers who occupy these types of roles would therefore perceive themselves to be less 
dependent on their teammates, and would be less concerned with relational aspects of team 
functioning, and consequently adopt a less relational approach to team formation compared to 
those who do not occupy critical roles. 
H3A: Decision makers whose roles have lower interdependence on team members would 
have lower relational bias to their teams compared to those whose roles have higher 
interdependence. 
Interdependence has been found to be a key variable in constraining variability in behavior, 
and in motivating and directing individuals to perform tasks (Fry, Kerr, & Lee, 1986; Liden & 
Mitchell, 1983). However, scholars have defined interdependence in many ways (e.g., Brass, 
1981; Kiggundu, 1981 & 1983; Tjosvold, 1986), and one of the important distinctions they make 
is between task interdependence and goal interdependence. In the former situation, team 
members share a common goal, whether or not they actually work together, whereas in the latter 
situation, team members must actually work together to accomplish the task (Mitchell & Silver, 
1990). 
Although the team may have high goal interdependence, at the individual level some roles 
may have more independently measurable performance parameters, resulting in a form of 
individual goal. For instance, on a new product development team, the R&D scientist’s 
performance can be independently measured compared to the marketing team member’s 
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performance. An individual goal might result in the individual developing strategies that focused 
on maximizing his or her own performance, which may be at the expense of the group 
performance (Mitchell & Silver, 1990). The research on bargaining, for example, suggests that 
individual goals lead to less integrative bargaining solutions (Earley & Northcraft, 1989; Huber 
& Neale, 1987) because the individual goal prompts negotiators to focus on individual gain, 
rather than dyadic profitability. Extending this argument, decision makers with lower role 
interdependence would have less loyalty to their partners in the backing-up subunit and would 
have lower relational bias compared to those with greater role interdependence. 
Several studies have reported a positive relationship between task interdependence and 
cooperation or helping behavior (e.g., Anderson & Williams, 1996; Pearce & Gregersen, 1991; 
Wageman & Baker, 1997). Higher levels of task interdependence may increase recognition of 
the need for coordination of effort and the need for helping to solve problems that arise 
(Anderson & Williams, 1996; Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2005). One mechanism by which 
decision makers can improve the likelihood of evoking prosocial behaviors from team members 
on whom they are more interdependent is to select from those with whom they have already 
worked, and whom they know they can count on. 
H3B: Decision makers whose roles have lower interdependence on team members would 
have lower relational bias in their backing-up subunits compared to those whose roles have 
higher interdependence. 
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4.4 DATASET 1: PROFESSIONAL SOCCER PLAYERS 
The soccer dataset comprises 56 top-flight professional soccer players, each of whom either 
chose his ideal teammates or selected his “Fantasy XI” or “Perfect XI.” Because soccer is played 
with 11 players, in the former case, decision makers made 10 choices; in the latter case, they 
made 11 selections. The data were obtained from three Internet data sources. The first data 
source was the official Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 
2006 Web site. FIFA is the official governing body of world soccer. Adidas, the sports apparel 
and footwear company, ran a “+10” campaign prior to and during the FIFA World Cup 2006 in 
which they asked 22 of the world’s leading soccer players to choose their ideal teammates. Both 
the choices and the rationales were published on the official FIFA World Cup 2006 Web site. 
The second data source was www.icons.com, which styles itself as “the official website of the 
world’s leading footballers [soccer players].” It houses the official personal Web sites of around 
70 soccer players, many of whom have a “Fantasy XI” Web page on which their selections and 
the accompanying rationales are published. It provided the selections of 28 players. The third 
data source was the Internet in general, through which the Fantasy XI selections of six other 
soccer players were obtained. Four of these players had provided their selections to the leading 
soccer magazine FourFourTwo, which runs a regular feature on its back page called “My Perfect 
XI,” which details a soccer personality’s favorite team, sometimes within certain criteria (e.g., 
players who have played for Liverpool clubs). 
There were three criteria for inclusion in the dataset. First, they had to be soccer players. The 
Adidas promotion included the selections of Joseph “Sepp” Blatter, the FIFA president, but these 
data were excluded because he had never played professional soccer. Second, they had to have 
represented their country. This resulted in the exclusion of 33 soccer players’ Fantasy XI 
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selections that were available from www.icons.com. Although, these players were professionals, 
because they had not played at the highest level they were unlikely to have relational ties with 
other top-flight players, and their approach to team formation was more akin to that of 
laypersons participating in fantasy leagues. Third, their choices should not have been constrained 
by a specific criterion. For instance, three “My Perfect XI” selections of soccer players who had 
represented their country, Graeme Sharpe, Michael Owen, and Ian Rush, obtained from 
FourFourTwo magazine, had to be excluded because their selections were constrained to those 
with or against whom they had played. The list of soccer players who comprise this dataset is 
provided in Appendix A, and includes players of 26 different nationalities. 
(a) Operationalization of variables 
Relational bias to team: Relational bias to the team is measured as the proportion of the team 
that has a relational tie to the decision maker. In this dataset, a relational tie is identified if the 
decision maker and the selectee are members of the same family (e.g., brother, father), or have 
played on the same team, either for club or for country.  
Relational bias to backing-up subunit:  In soccer the playing positions or roles are strikers (or 
forwards), midfielders, and defenders (including goal-keeper). From the literature and my 
discussion with Pitt Men’s Soccer Coach Joe Luxbacher, it appears that there is general 
consensus that the backing-up subunit for strikers is the midfielder unit. For defenders, it is the 
defender unit (defenders and goal-keeper). However, the backing-up subunit for midfielders is 
not clearly defined, and could vary by formation. In the “diamond” formation (4-1-2-1-2), the 
two central midfielders are positioned forward (attacking midfielder) and back (defensive 
midfielder), to form a diamond shape with the left and right midfielders (winger-midfielders). In 
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this case, the backing-up subunit for the attacking midfielder is the defensive midfielder and the 
winger-midfielders. However, in the standard 4-4-2 formation, the two central midfielders form a 
straight line (rather than a diamond) with their left and right midfielders, and the central 
defenders are their backing-up subunit. In order to minimize complexity of coding and 
interpretation, I have computed the relational bias metrics of the backing-up subunit of decision 
makers who are midfielders by considering the rest of the midfielder unit and 50% of the 
defender unit as their backing-up subunit. 
Leader v/s Selector Condition: Decision-makers in the leader condition have been coded 1, 
and decision makers in the selector condition have been coded 0. 
Individualism-Collectivism: Typically, individualism-collectivism has been measured 
through questionnaire surveys. However, this dissertation uses archival data, and operationalizes 
individualism-collectivism as an individual difference variable, using national culture as a proxy.  
The two most widely used classifications of nations on cultural dimensions are by Hofstede 
(1980), who originated this line of research, and Project Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE), a research program focusing on culture and leadership in 61 
nations (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). I have used the latter as my basis for 
operationalizing the individualism-collectivism dimension for two reasons. First, it is considered 
one of the most influential studies investigating cultural variations in terms of which leadership 
traits are effective (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007), and second, it is clearly focused on leaders 
and leadership, which are central to this dissertation. 
Project GLOBE (unlike Hofstede’s taxonomy) measures two different forms of collectivism, 
namely, societal collectivism and ingroup collectivism. Ingroup collectivism reflects the degree 
to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families 
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(House et al., 2002). Societal collectivism reflects the degree to which organizational and 
societal institutional practices encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and 
collective action (House et al., 2002).  
From a theoretical point of view, the operationalization of individualism-collectivism that is 
most relevant to the dependent variable, relational bias, is ingroup collectivism. I have therefore 
operationalized individualism-collectivism by using the country-level measures of ingroup 
collectivism. In some cases, the nationality of the team leader was not included in the 61 nations 
surveyed by Project GLOBE. In these cases, I have used the closest neighboring country for 
which a measure was available as a proxy. 
Individual role interdependence:  There is general agreement among soccer experts that the 
midfielder role is the most critical and least role interdependent among soccer positions. 
According to Jeffrey (1935), the half-back line is the most important part of the team. 
Midfielders connect the defensive unit with the forward line, and exemplify the definition of 
critical team members who “act as go-betweens, bridging the ‘structural holes’ between 
disconnected others” (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001). Individual role interdependence was 
operationalized by coding midfielders as 1, and non-midfielders as 0. 
Amount of experience: Amount of experience was operationalized as the number of years of 
professional club playing experience the decision maker had. 
Diversity of experience: Diversity of experience was operationalized as the number of 
professional clubs for which the decision maker had played.  
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(b) Results 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the variables in 
the study. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients – Soccer player dataset 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Control Variables
1 Amount of experience 13.13 4.41
2 Diversity of experience 4.09 2.13 .59**
Independent Variables
3 Leader v/s Selector Condition .41 .50 -.34* -.40**
4 Individualism-Collectivism 5.50 .33 -.15 -.32* -.03
5 Individual role interdependence .52 .50 -.14 -.08 .15 -.07
Dependent Variables
6 Relational bias (RB) to team .38 .31 .06 .04 .32* -.17 -.02
7 RB to backing-up subunit .32 .30 .16 -.01 .36** -.15 .06 .71**
 * p < .05
** p < .01  
Decision makers, on average, have relational ties to 38% of their team members. Decision 
makers in the leader condition, on average, had relational ties to 50% of their team, whereas 
those in the selector condition had relational ties to 31% of their team. Of the three independent 
variables, only leader versus selector condition variable, is significantly positively correlated 
with both dependent variables: relational bias to the team (r = .32, p < .05) and relational bias to 
the backing-up unit (r = .36, p < .01). This result lends support to hypotheses 1A and 1B, which 
predicted that leaders would manifest significantly higher relational bias to both the team and the 
backing-up subunit compared to selectors. 
Individualism-collectivism was not significantly correlated with either of the dependent 
variables, indicating a lack of support for hypotheses 2A and 2B, which predicted that decision 
makers from more collectivistic cultures would manifest significantly higher relational bias to 
both team and to backing-up subunit compared to those from more individualistic cultures.  
Individual role interdependence was not significantly correlated with either of the dependent 
variables, indicating lack of support for hypotheses 3A and 3B, which predicted that decision 
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makers with greater role interdependence would manifest higher relational bias to the team and 
to the backing-up subunit compared to those with lower role interdependence. 
The two dependent variables, relational bias to team and relational bias to backing-up 
subunit, are highly correlated (r = .71, p < .01), as expected, because the latter measure forms 
part of the former measure.  
Regression Analysis 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, entering the control variables (amount of 
experience and diversity of experience) in the first step, and the independent variables (leader-
selector, individualism-collectivism, individual role interdependence) in the second step. 
Standardized regression coefficients and changes in explained variance were examined. The 
regression models are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Regression models – Soccer player dataset 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Control Variables
1 Amount of Experience .06 .12 .26 .34
2 Diversity of Experience .01 .09 -.16 -.06
Independent Variables
3 Leader v/s Selector .41** .45**
4 Collectivism -.12 -.10
5 Role Interdependence (Midfielders = 1) -.07 .03
Total R-square .00 .17 .04 .24
R-square change .17* .20**
 * p < .05
** p < .01
Relational bias to team Relational bias to backing up subunit
 
With regard to relational bias to the team, the change in r-squared was significant (∆ r2 = .17, 
p < .05) when the second block of variables (independent variables) was entered. Of the three 
independent variables, only one, leader versus selector condition, was significantly related to the 
dependent variable (β = .41, p < .01). Thus hypothesis 1A, which predicted that leaders would 
have higher relational bias to the team compared to selectors was supported.  
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With regard to relational bias to the team, the change in r-squared was significant (∆ r2 = .20, 
p < .01) when the second block of variables (independent variables) was entered. Of the three 
independent variables, only one, leader versus selector condition, was significantly related to the 
dependent variable (β = .45, p < .01). Thus hypothesis 1B, which predicted that leaders would 
have higher relational bias to the backing-up subunit compared to selectors was supported. 
Because the two control variables, amount of experience and diversity of experience, were 
highly correlated (r = .59, p < .01), the hierarchical regression models were rerun separately, 
entering only one of them each time. Both models returned almost identical results; however, in 
the models in which the control variables were entered singly the incremental r-squared was 
significant at p < .05, whereas in the model which included both control variables the 
incremental r-squared was significant at p < .01, meaning that the latter model is more fully 
supported. 
Also, regression models were run using alternative operationalizations of the individualism-
collectivism and individual role interdependence variables. Substituting Hofstede’s (2001) 
measure of individualism in place of the Project GLOBE measure of ingroup collectivism 
generated similar results. With regard to individual role interdependence, the case could be made 
that the performance of attacking players in soccer could be measured independently in terms of 
goals scored and assists, and hence it is they, rather than the midfielders, who have the lowest 
role interdependence. Accordingly, the models were run with strikers and attacking midfielders 
dummy coded as 1, and the other playing positions as 0, but once again, the results were not 
statistically significant, and were almost identical to those obtained with the original 
operationalization. 
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(c) Conclusions and Discussion 
The results suggest that decision makers use relational ties as a general heuristic when 
forming teams. Even in unconstrained “fantasy” situations, rather than populate the team purely 
based on competence — for instance, if they only selected the legends of the sport, or those who 
were widely considered to currently be the best in the world — they made some selections based 
on relational ties. The mean relational bias to the team was 31% for those in the selector 
condition and was significantly higher for those in the leader condition (50%), suggesting that 
the general heuristic with regard to relational ties is adopted even more strongly by those in a 
leadership role. This finding is in line with traditional leadership research that relational or 
people orientation is a fundamental dimension of leadership. 
The results also suggest that the leader-selector manipulation was strong enough to overcome 
the mitigating effect of the decision makers’ expertise. Billings and Scherer (1988) quote 
Bettman (1982) that in cases where decision makers possess sufficient knowledge of the decision 
task, there may be no difference between judgment and choice. Some scholars (e.g., Ungson, 
Braunstein, & Hall, 1981) argue that extensive experience with a variety of complex decisions 
produces high-quality decision-making performances in executives that are relatively free from 
bias (Schwenk, 1984). 
4.5 DATASET 2: NFL HEAD COACHES 
In order to create a dataset that would be comparable to the soccer dataset, I decided to use a 
newly appointed head coach’s initial (first-year) coaching roster as representative of his approach 
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to team formation. I have accordingly recreated the initial coaching rosters of 79 NFL head 
coaches. In this study, the coaching staff includes assistant coaches involved in offense, defense, 
special teams, and strength and conditioning. A list of the head coaches, teams, and the year for 
which the coaching roster has been compiled is provided in Appendix B. 
The dataset comprises not only the coaching roster, but also the entire National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) and professional playing and coaching career history of each 
member of the roster. This information was culled from the Internet from a variety of Web sites, 
including the official NFL Web site, individual teams’ Web sites, NCAA college Web sites, fan 
sites, fan blogs, sports database Web sites (e.g., armchairgm.com, profootballdatabase.com), 
press archive sites (e.g., New York Times archives), social networking sites (e.g., linkedin.com, 
zoominfobusinesspeople.com) and other Web sites (e.g., the Fellowship of Christian Athletes). 
In some cases, an individual coach’s career history had to be pieced together from several 
individual Web extracts. 
This dataset affords the opportunity to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
individual role interdependence and relational bias, to the team (H3A), and to the backing-up 
subunit (H3B). 
(a) Operationalization of variables 
Relational bias: A relational tie exists between an NFL head coach and a member of his 
coaching staff if they have been members of the same organization in the past, e.g., both 
individuals were members of the same coaching staff in the past, or one individual was a player 
and the other was a coach in the past.  
 44 
These relational ties were identified by searching the career history database that was created 
as part of this dissertation and locating instances where there were matches of organization and 
tenure between members of the same coaching staff. This approach to identifying relational ties 
is more conservative than is the norm in the sports media. For instance, the Pittsburgh Tribune-
Review identifies two more relational ties than I do in Pittsburgh Steelers Head Coach Mike 
Tomlin’s coaching staff. (A copy of the article is provided in Appendix E.) One tie, accounted 
for by geographical proximity, is between Quarterbacks Coach Ken Anderson and Mike Tomlin, 
because they were both based in Cincinnati at the same time, the former with the Cincinnati 
Bengals and the latter with the University of Cincinnati. The other tie they identify is an indirect 
or second-order tie, in which Special Teams Coach Bob Ligashevsky met Coach Tomlin through 
a mutual friend. Thus, based on the media report, the relational bias for Coach Tomlin is 7 out of 
16, or 43.75%, but based on my approach, it is 5 out of 16, or 31.25%. Although the more 
conservative approach has been adopted in order to maintain consistency across all head coaches 
in the dataset, it is important to note that the computation of relational bias is an underestimate of 
the actual relational bias. 
Backing-up subunits:  Jones (1974) states that in football, the offensive and defensive squads 
are highly specialized in their respective functions, and they play as units. Head coaches are 
typically well known for their expertise either on offense or on defense. For instance, Bill Walsh 
is identified with the “West Coast Offense” and Buddy Ryan with the “46 Defense.” Thus the 
term backing-up subunit could be interpreted in three ways: (1) it could be the subunit that 
reflects the head coach’s expertise; e.g., if the head coach was a former offensive coordinator, 
offense is his backing-up subunit, and vice versa for defense; (2) it could be the subunit opposite 
to the one in which the head coach is the expert; e.g., if the head coach was a former offensive 
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coordinator, he could need support or backup in terms of defense; and (3) similar to soccer, 
where the defense is always backing up the offense, irrespective of the background of the head 
coach, the defensive coaching staff could always be considered the backing-up subunit. In this 
dissertation, I have interpreted the term backing-up subunit in the first manner. The backing-up 
subunit for head coaches with a background in defense is the defensive coaching unit, and for 
those with a background in offense it is the offensive coaching unit. 
Individual role interdependence:  Within sports teams, the team’s offensive and defensive 
systems are designed in such a way that formal roles are clearly specified for each member 
(Bray, 1998). In American football, the defensive unit is considered to be less about individuals 
and more about coordinated action, whereas some of the roles on the offensive unit, such as 
quarterback, running back, and wide receiver, are considered to be more about the individual, or 
more role independent. This appears to be because players in these roles or positions can score 
points, and thus have an individual goal condition in a team setting (Mitchell & Silver, 1990). 
Typically, the highest salaries in the league are paid to quarterbacks, running backs, wide 
receivers, and left tackles, all of which are positions in the offensive unit.  
Individual role interdependence is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the head coach has a 
defensive background and 0 if he does not. 
Conference: The 32 teams in the NFL are equally divided between two conferences, the 
American Football Conference (AFC) and the National Football Conference (NFC). Each team 
attempts to emerge as the winner in the conference to which it belongs, enabling it to compete in 
the Super Bowl, which is the ultimate prize every season. Further, there are widely held opinions 
among sportscasters and those who follow the sport with regard to one conference or the other. 
An example of one such opinion is that the AFC has been the more competitive conference over 
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the last several years, and whichever team wins the AFC conference will go on to beat its NFC 
rival in the Super Bowl. Based on these considerations, conference has been controlled for, with 
head coaches of AFC teams coded 1, and NFC teams coded 0. 
Race: Race has been controlled for, with non-Caucasian coaches coded 1, and Caucasian 
coaches coded 0. 
Promotion from within: This variable controls for whether the newly appointed head coach is 
an external hire (coded 0), or promoted from within (coded 1).  
Professional playing experience: This variable controls for whether the head coach had 
played professionally in the NFL prior to joining the coaching ranks (coded 1) or otherwise 
(coded 0).  
Amount of experience: Amount of experience was operationalized as the head coach’s total 
number of years of NFL coaching experience (including as an assistant coach). 
Diversity of experience: Diversity of experience was operationalized as the number of 
professional clubs at which the head coach has worked, either as an assistant coach or as a head 
coach. 
(b) Results 
The sample comprised 79 head coaches, of whom 38 (48%) coached AFC teams, 10 
(12.65%) were of non-Caucasian ethnicity (9 African-American, 1 Hispanic-American), 13 
(16.46%) were promoted from within, 25 (31.65%) were former NFL players, and 36 (45.57%) 
were from a defensive background. In this sample, the average number of organizations at which 
a head coach had coached prior to being appointed was 5.72 (3.23 colleges, 2.49 NFL teams). 
The average number of years of professional coaching experience was 13.67.  
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Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the dependent 
and independent variables. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients – NFL head coach dataset 
Mean s.d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Control Variables
1 Conference .48 .50
2 Race .14 .35 .06
3 Promoted from within .16 .37 .19 -.08
4 Professional playing background .33 .47 -.02 .19 .13
5 Diversity of experience 5.72 2.66 -.06 -.14 -.07 -.57**
6 Amount of experience 13.67 7.55 .10 .12 .03 .09 .06
Independent Variable
7 Individual role interdependence .46 .50 .17 .21 .07 -.11 .17 .14
Dependent Variables
8 Relational bias to team .35 .22 .09 -.04 .50** .05 .04 .01 .06
9 Relational bias to offensive subunit .39 .26 .06 -.02 .45** .06 .06 .07 -.06 .84**
10 Relational bias to defensive subunit .34 .27 .08 -.05 .38** .05 -.02 -.03 .28* .73** .43**
 * p < .05
** p < .01  
The mean relational bias to the team is 35%, meaning that on average, an NFL head coach 
has relational ties to around one-third of his coaching staff. The mean relational bias to the 
offensive and defensive subunit is 39% and 34 %, respectively. 
The professional playing background variable is significantly negatively correlated with the 
diversity of experience variable (r = -.57, p < .01). This reflects the fact that most head coaches 
who were formerly NFL players joined the NFL coaching ranks directly as assistant coaches, 
compared to the rest, who typically spent several years coaching at various colleges before 
breaking into the professional coaching ranks. 
The promotion from within variable is significantly positively correlated with all three 
dependent variables: relational bias to the team (r = .50, p < .01), relational bias to the offensive 
subunit (r = .45, p < .01), and relational bias to the defensive subunit (r = .38, p < .01). This 
reflects that fact that there is much less turnover among the coaching staff in cases of promotion 
than in cases where the head coach is an external hire. Consequently, the number of relational 
ties between the promoted head coach and members of the coaching staff is very high, resulting 
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in higher relational bias to the team as a whole, and to the subunits of the team, compared to 
cases where the head coach was an external hire.  
The three dependent variables are highly intercorrelated, as is to be expected. Relational bias 
to team is significantly positively correlated with relational bias to offensive subunit (r = .84, p < 
.01) and with relational bias to defensive subunit (r = .73, p < .01). This is expected because the 
relational bias to the offensive and defensive subunits together account for the majority of the 
relational bias to the team (except for the relational ties between the head coach and the other 
two smaller subunits, namely, special teams and strength and conditioning). The relational bias 
to the offensive and defensive subunits are also significantly positively correlated to each other (r 
= .43, p < .01), which could be reflective of a head coach’s propensity to form teams on a 
relational basis across all subunits. 
The variable of interest, individual role interdependence, with defensive background coded 1, 
is significantly positively correlated (r = .28, p < .05) with relational bias in the defensive 
subunit. This result lends support to hypothesis 3B, which predicted that decision makers from a 
more interdependent role background should have higher relational bias to their backing-up 
subunit compared to decision makers from a more independent role background. The fact that 
the defensive background variable is negatively (though not significantly) correlated with the 
relational bias to the offensive subunit is also in line with hypothesis 3B. 
Regression Models 
Because the sample consisted of a pooled, cross-sectional dataset based on panel data, OLS 
regression models will not estimate unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2003). A panel effect 
model such as fixed effects or random effects would control for unobserved heterogeneity. In 
this study, a fixed effects model was utilized, grouping the 79 data points into the 32 NFL clubs. 
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Because the promotion from within variable was highly correlated with all three dependent 
variables, separate models were run, with it excluded (Model 1 in all three cases), and with it 
included (Model 2 in all three cases). 
The regression models are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Regression models – NFL head coach dataset 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Control Variables
1 Race -.13 -.03 -.10 .01 -.20 -.11
2 Professional playing background .11 .06 .15 .10 .06 .02
3 Promotion from within .35** .40** .34**
4 Diversity of experience .01 .01 .02 .01 -.01 -.01
5 Amount of experience -.00 .00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00
Independent Variables
6 Individual role interdependence .16* .101 .07 .00 .33** .27**
R-squared (within) .14 .43 .07 .34 .30 .46
R-squared (between) .07 .00 .06 .00 .01 .01
R-squared (overall) .01 .23 .01 .20 .11 .22
1 p < .10
 * p < .05
** p < .01
Relational Bias (Team) Relational Bias (Offense) Relational Bias (Defense)
 
Because the conference dummy variable is fixed for each NFL club, it was dropped from the 
model. From Table 4B, it can be seen that the promotion from within variable is highly 
significant in all models, and the overall explained variance is higher when it is included than 
when it is not. However, the individual role interdependence variable is a statistically significant 
predictor of relational bias to the team (r = .16, p < .05) in Model 1 when promotion from within 
is excluded, and is marginally significant (r = .10, p < .10) in Model 2 when it is included. Thus, 
hypothesis 3A, which predicted that decision makers with higher role interdependence would 
have higher relational bias to their teams compared to those with lower role interdependence, is 
supported. 
The individual role interdependence variable is a statistically significant predictor of 
relational bias to defensive subunit in both Model 1 (r = .33, p < .01) and Model 2 (r = .27, p < 
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.01). Thus, hypothesis 3B, which predicted that decision makers with higher role 
interdependence would have higher relational bias to their backing-up subunits compared to 
those with lower role interdependence, is supported. 
(c) Alternative operationalizations of dependent variables 
The dependent variable, relational bias to the team, as operationalized, only measures the 
proportion of ties between the head coach and his coaching staff. It does not distinguish between 
the following scenarios: (1) Sean Payton (New Orleans Saints, 2006) has five relational ties to 
his coaching staff of 17 team members, but they have an additional three ties among themselves; 
and (2) Dom Capers (Houston Texans, 2002) has five relational ties to his coaching staff of 17 
team members, but they have an additional nine ties among themselves. It is important to 
distinguish between such scenarios because in the former case, the relational ties within the team 
appear to be driven by the head coach, whereas in the latter case, they appear to be driven by 
other team members.  
In order to explore this aspect, I created two additional dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable, proportion of total ties, measured the extent to which the head coach 
accounted for the total number of intra-team ties. In the two aforementioned cases, this resulted 
in a metric of 0.63 for Sean Payton and 0.31 for Dom Capers, which indicated the relational bias 
of each head coach relative to the overall relational ties within the team.  
The second dependent variable, proportion of total tenure, measured the extent to which the 
head coach accounted for the total number of years of prior overlapping tenure. In the former of 
the two aforementioned cases, the eight relational ties among all members of Sean Payton’s 
coaching staff accounted for 21 years of overlapping tenure (in various organizations), and 
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Coach Payton’s five ties accounted for 14 years of those 21 years. This resulted in a metric of 
0.67 for Coach Payton. In the latter of the two cases, Dom Capers accounted for 28 years of the 
62 years of overlapping prior tenure, which resulted in a metric of 0.45.  
Whereas the first dependent variable is a ratio of binary ties, the second dependent variable is 
a ratio of valued ties. A similar fixed effects model was run with each of these dependent 
variables, but neither were the full models supported, nor were any of the independent variables 
significant predictors of either of these dependent variables.  
(d) Conclusions and Discussion 
The results, in general, support both hypotheses tested in this dataset. Decision makers whose 
role interdependence is higher have higher relational bias to their teams and to their backing-up 
subunits. 
The strong influence of promotion from within on the dependent variables, although not 
surprising, has interesting implications for team formation, particularly in the strategic 
management area. When organizations appoint a CEO, an internal appointment may result in 
essentially the same management team continuing, whereas an external hire may not only reduce 
the level of relational ties within the team, but also skew it toward his or her own prior 
professional assignments. Further, whether the CEO comes from, say, a sales background (lower 
role interdependence) or a marketing background (higher role interdependence) may determine 
not only the extent to which he or she would hire based on relational ties, but also in which 
subunits of the management team these hires would be located. Further research could be 
conducted to test these hypotheses. 
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The intuition underlying the conceptualization of the alternative dependent variables, 
proportion of total ties and proportion of total tenure, will be more directly testable through a 
social network analysis methodology. Social network analysis would provide different measures 
of centrality, such as degree centrality or betweenness centrality, for each of the members of the 
coaching staff. This should provide a clearer picture of how central the head coach is within the 
internal network, and if he is central, what form of centrality he holds. Analysis might also reveal 
if the team has network components that may or may not be reflective of the organizational 
subunits (e.g., offense or defense). This line of research appears to be promising, and I intend to 
pursue it in the future. 
4.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The mean relational bias to the team, in the soccer player dataset (across both decision 
task demand conditions) was 38.1%, and in the NFL head coaches dataset was 35%. In both 
datasets, the relational bias measures are underestimates of the actual relational bias because only 
ties that are can be ascertained from archival records, such as family or professional ties, have 
been counted. Decision makers’ relational ties also include their friends, neighbors, and those 
they may have met informally in either social or professional settings. If it were possible to 
ascertain these ties as well, the relational bias would increase, and may even account for more 
than 50% of the team members. This in turn raises the question, is the relational approach the 
bias from the more rational, instrumental, open search process? Or, is the relational approach the 
preferred or dominant approach, and the open search process the deviation (or bias), to fill the 
gaps? Further research needs to investigate this issue. 
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Although the relational approach is similar to the network constraint approach (Ruef et 
al., 2003), this study highlights an important difference. Leaders and selectors in the soccer 
player dataset included team members who had relational ties to them, even though their 
decision making was not constrained. This implies that the relational approach is a general 
heuristic, that decision makers adopt because they want to, and not because they have to, due to 
network or other constraints.  
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5.0  STUDY 2: DECISION MAKERS’ RATIONALES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The nascent literature on team member selection suggests that decision makers should take 
into account problems that are seldom considered when selecting individuals to work by 
themselves (Jones, Stevens, & Fischer, 2000; Morgeson et al., 2005). The team formation 
literature, like the teams literature in general, distinguishes between task-related and teamwork-
related factors. Taskwork and teamwork are the bases of Goodwin’s (1999) typology for 
classifying knowledge, skills, abilities, and other factors for team staffing. Liang (1994) 
considers three types of selection schemata, two of which (position based and intelligence based) 
could be considered task related, and a third (coordination based) that could be considered 
teamwork related. A similar distinction is made with regard to team member contributions, 
which are bifurcated into task inputs, i.e., an individual’s contributions to task accomplishment, 
and maintenance inputs, i.e., an individual’s contribution to relationships in a team (Gómez, 
Kirkman, & Shapiro, 2000). 
Both these dimensions may be important criteria for individuals charged with forming teams. 
Some scholars claim that individuals rely on indicators of task-related competence when 
choosing future group members (Hinds et al., 2000). Other scholars make the case that at the 
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individual level of analysis, expectations with regard to teamwork behaviors are important (Eby, 
Meade, Parisi, & Douthitt, 1999).  
Teams and groups researchers emphasize the importance of the teamwork dimension with 
regard to team composition and team performance. According to Moreland, Levine, and Wingert 
(1996), one of the central questions in team composition is: “will any special chemistry occur?” 
Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005) state that teamwork is key to ensuring the success of a team. 
Evidence from small group research suggests that how well individual team members’ ability 
and expertise are integrated within a team may be more important to team performance than the 
task-related abilities themselves (Liang, 1994). If chemistry is the most critical aspect for team 
performance, and it is “rare, valuable, and difficult to manage” (Moreland et al., 1996: 21), 
decision makers should use it as a primary heuristic in team formation. They could either select 
entire teams or subteams where chemistry is known to already exist, or use it as a salient 
criterion in selecting the individuals who will form the team. 
Thus, based on the team formation literature, two conclusions emerge. First, decision 
makers’ selection rationales should be classifiable into only two categories: taskwork related and 
teamwork related. Second, decision makers should have more teamwork-related rationales than 
taskwork-related rationales. 
However, from Study 1 in this dissertation, it is apparent that when individuals make team 
member selection decisions to form teams, they are biased toward those to whom they have prior 
relational ties. Thus it is likely that some of the rationales provided by decision makers may be 
related to the ties they have with the selectee. Therefore, a third category, i.e., tie-related 
rationales, is also included. 
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In Study 2, a content analysis is conducted of the selection rationales of decision makers in 
the soccer player dataset with a view to: (1) identifying the relative importance of each category, 
and, (2) examining the relationship of tie-related rationales in particular with the same three 
independent variables that were considered in Study 1. 
5.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Decision task demand: Leader versus Selector condition 
Once again, I draw upon the distinction between choice and judgment tasks to develop the 
hypothesis. Individual decision makers in the selector condition are performing a judgment task, 
whereas those in the leader condition are choosing teammates, which is a choice task. A 
judgment task involves abstract evaluation, whereas a choice task involves the person. Because 
choices can signal one’s identity to others (Shavitt & Nelson, 2000), they trigger self-referent 
processing, defined as “any evaluation of an option in conjunction with, or in relation to, the 
individual’s self-concept” (Sood & Forehand, 2005: 145). In the leader condition, there should 
be more self-referent processing, which makes the leader’s prior professional experiences and 
relationships more salient, resulting in more tie-related rationales. 
Research that has investigated the process-oriented differences between choice and judgment 
has found support for the notion that the former often involves simplifying heuristics, where 
individuals focus on a subset of the available information, whereas the latter often involves 
holistic processes, where individuals examine a more complete set of information (Billings & 
Scherer, 1988; Schkade & Johnson, 1989; Senter & Wedell, 1999; Sood & Forehand, 2005; 
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Wedell & Senter, 1997). This suggests that decision makers in the selector condition may report 
rationales across all three categories, thereby focusing less on any one category.  
H4: Decision makers in the leader condition would provide more tie-related rationales 
compared to those in the selector condition. 
(b) Individualism-Collectivism 
People who have independent self-construals and define themselves as independent of 
relationships, viewing relationships as much less necessary for self-fulfillment and satisfaction, 
have less important or frequent thoughts about relationships and relationship partners (Cross & 
Morris, 2003). This suggests that decision makers from individualistic national cultures would 
provide fewer tie-related rationales. 
When individuals define themselves in terms of a domain, they tend to pay close attention to 
domain-relevant stimuli and to develop elaborate knowledge structures for that domain (Markus 
& Wurf, 1987). Thus, individuals who define themselves relationally will have well-developed 
cognitive-associative networks for the domain of relationships (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
Research conducted by Cross and colleagues concluded that highly relational persons and those 
who had positive associations for relationships were more likely than others to remember 
relational information about others and to organize information about others in terms of 
relationships (Cross & Morris, 2003; Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002). This suggests that decision 
makers from collectivistic national cultures would provide more tie-related rationales. 
H5A: Decision makers from collectivistic cultures would provide more tie-related rationales 
compared to those from individualistic cultures. 
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Individualists are expected to rely primarily on themselves (Gómez et al., 2000), to have a 
low need for affiliation (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1984), and to be less concerned with group 
harmony or cohesiveness than collectivists (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis et al., 1988). Also, 
individualists devalue team effort in achievement-related contexts, devalue the importance of 
teams for personal well-being, and prefer high degrees of personal autonomy and self-sufficiency 
(Dion & Dion, 1991; Taggar & Haines, 2006; Wagner & Moch, 1986). Kirkman and Shapiro 
(2001) found that in teams composed of individuals who were, on average, lower in collectivism, 
resistance to teams was greater. These findings suggest that for individualists, teamwork-related 
aspects would not be particularly salient. 
Taggar and Haines (2006) found support for the positive relationship between collectivism 
and self-efficacy for teamwork, suggesting that collectivists would provide more teamwork-
related rationales. 
H5B: Decision makers from collectivistic cultures would provide more teamwork- related 
rationales compared to those from individualistic cultures. 
In individualistic cultures, the emphasis is more on task than on people (Triandis et al., 
1988). People from individualistic cultures are more likely to value contributions to task 
accomplishment than are people from collectivistic cultures (Gómez et al., 2000; Kim, Park, & 
Suzuki, 1990). In fact, individualists may prioritize task achievement at the expense of 
relationships, whereas collectivists may place more emphasis on harmonious relationships at the 
expense of task accomplishment (Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998). This suggests that decision 
makers from more individualistic cultures would provide more taskwork-related rationales 
compared to those from more collectivistic cultures. 
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H5C: Decision makers from individualistic cultures would provide more taskwork-related 
rationales compared to those from collectivistic cultures. 
(c) Individual role interdependence 
Van der Vegt, Emans, and Van de Vliert (2001) found that low goal interdependence within 
members of highly task-interdependent teams explained negative affective outcomes at the 
individual rather than team level. This suggests that decision makers who have higher goal or 
role interdependence would behave differently from those who have lower interdependence with 
regard to those with whom they are highly task interdependent. As discussed earlier, individuals 
with lower goal interdependence would focus on their individual goals, sometimes at the expense 
of group performance. Compared to those with higher goal interdependence, they would be less 
group oriented and therefore would have lower tie-related rationales. 
H6: Decision makers whose roles have higher interdependence on team members  would 
provide more tie-related rationales compared to those whose roles have lower 
interdependence. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
The rationales provided by the decision makers in the soccer player dataset with regard to 
each of their selection choices have been content analyzed. Whereas the use of self-reported 
rationales for decisions as data is not common in the organizational behavior (see Isenberg, 1986 
for an exception) and related literature, it has been used in the marketing literature (e.g., Cripps 
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& Meyer, 1994; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) conclude that people 
may have little ability to report accurately on their cognitive processes. However, the studies 
from which this conclusion was drawn typically put naïve subjects in novel situations. In this 
case, the subjects are being asked to give rationales for decisions in a task they are familiar with, 
and hence this concern is mitigated.  
In order to develop a coding scheme for the selection rationales, I undertook the following 
six steps. First, I reviewed the literature on soccer, and interviewed Joe Luxbacher, head coach of 
the University of Pittsburgh men’s soccer team, to develop a list of factors that are important for 
selecting soccer players. The factors that are considered important include: physical attributes 
and conditioning, soccer skills, personality, and soccer intelligence. Second, I mapped these 
factors onto Goodwin’s (1999) four-cell typology of staffing and composition predictors in team 
situations: teamwork-specific, teamwork-generic, taskwork-specific, and taskwork-generic. This 
typology was developed in a military context, and included factors such as physical strength and 
stamina, which are particularly relevant to a soccer context. Third, because Goodwin’s (1999) 
typology, like other classifications of team selection factors, only considered the taskwork and 
teamwork dimensions, I added a third category to include leader- or ego-related factors. This 
category included the following subcategories: (1) explicit mention of professional relationship 
to selectee, (2) explicit mention of common ties between decision maker and selectee, which 
could involve common nationality or common organization, (3) any other rationale that does not 
fall into any of the other categories. Fourth, a draft, initial coding scheme, based on the 
integration of the soccer literature and Goodwin’s (1999) typology, with the addition of the tie-
related rationales, was created. This draft coding scheme is presented in Appendix F. Fifth, in 
order to test the coding scheme, I coded the entire content myself and also had an independent 
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coder code a sample of the content. This revealed two shortcomings of the coding scheme: (1) it 
was too detailed and made the coding extremely laborious, and (2) even though both personality 
and team spirit are categorized under the teamwork-generic category, the latter is more explicitly 
related to teamwork compared to the former, and coding them separately would provide more 
meaningful data. Sixth, a new, simpler coding scheme was developed and used for the content 
analysis. The final coding scheme is presented in Appendix G. 
The entire content was coded by two independent coders who were unaware of the study’s 
predictions. The inter-coder reliability, as measured by the unweighted Cohen’s Kappa, was 
87.7%, and disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
5.4 RESULTS 
The dataset for the content analysis comprised 52 individuals, because selection rationales 
for four individuals (Geoff Hurst, Rodney Marsh, Pavel Nedved, and Petr Cech) were 
unavailable. A total of 979 selection rationales were coded. The breakdown of the rationales into 
the six categories is provided in Table 6.  
Table 6: Breakdown of selection rationales by category 
Taskwork-related Teamwork-related Tie-related Total
Generic 82 (8.4%) 95 (9.7%) 177 (18.1%)
Specific 488 (49.8%) 89 (9.1%) 577 (58.9%)
Total 570 (58.2%) 184 (18.8%) 225 (23%) 979  
Of the total rationales, 58.2% were taskwork related, 23% were tie related, and 18.8% were 
teamwork related. Of the 95 teamwork-generic rationales, 55 (58%) were personality related and 
40 (42%) were team spirit related, comprising 5.7% and 4.1% of the total rationales, 
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respectively. That the rationales were heavily skewed toward the taskwork-specific category 
suggests that decision makers in team settings are not very different from those selecting for 
individual positions. Not only did the teamwork-related category account for the lowest number 
of rationales, the team spirit-related rationales accounted for only 4.1% of the total. These results 
are even more surprising because the decision makers are professional soccer players, and soccer 
is a quintessential team sport, in which teamwork and team spirit are of paramount importance. 
Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the control variables, 
independent variables, and dependent variables at the broad category level, i.e., taskwork related, 
teamwork related, and tie related.  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Control Variables
1 Amount of experience 12.98 4.44
2 Diversity of experience 4.04 2.17 .59**
Independent Variables
3 Leader v/s Selector Condition .44 .50 -.33* -.39**
4 Individualism-Collectivism 5.49 .34 -.15 -.32* -.00
5 Individual role interdependence .54 .50 -.14 -.04 .13 -.06
Dependent Variables
6 Taskwork-related rationales 10.96 2.45 .34* .31* -.69** .09 .09
7 Teamwork-related rationales 3.54 2.43 .15 .18 .46** -.05 -.00 .39**
8 Tie-related rationales 4.33 2.71 .12 .04 .14 .10 .03 -.41** -.16
 * p < .05
** p < .01  
Of the three independent variables, only the decision task demand variable, which 
operationalized the leader versus selector conditions, is significantly correlated with two of the 
dependent variables, taskwork-related rationales (r = -.69, p < .01) and teamwork-related 
rationales (r =.46, p < .01). However, the relationship with tie-related rationales is not 
significant, indicating lack of support for hypothesis 4.  
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Two of the dependent variables, teamwork- and tie-related rationales, are significantly 
negatively correlated with each other, suggesting that perhaps the two underlying constructs are 
orthogonal to each other. Further research is needed to understand the relationship between them. 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, entering the control variables (amount of 
experience and diversity of experience) in the first step, and the independent variables (leader-
selector, individualism-collectivism, individual role interdependence) in the second step. 
Standardized regression coefficients and changes in explained variance were examined. The 
regression models are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Regression models. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Control Variables
1 Amount of experience .24 .14 .07 .01 .14 .17
2 Diversity of experience .17 .02 .14 -.03 -.05 .07
Independent Variables
3 Leader v/s Selector Condition -.64** -.47** .22
4 Individualism-Collectivism .11 -.06 .16
5 Individual role independence .01 .06 .04
Total R-square .13 .50 .04 .22 .01 .07
R-square change .37** .18* .06
 * p < .05
** p < .01
Taskwork-related rationales Teamwork-related rationales Tie-related rationales
 
With regard to taskwork-related rationales, the change in r-squared was highly significant (∆ 
r2 = .37, p < .01) when the second block of variables (independent variables) was entered. Of the 
three independent variables, only one, leader versus selector condition, was a significant 
predictor of taskwork-related rationales (β = -.64, p < .01). With regard to teamwork-related 
rationales, the change in r-squared was significant (∆ r2 = .18, p < .05) when the second block of 
variables (independent variables) was entered. Of the three independent variables, only one, 
leader versus selector condition, was a significant predictor of teamwork-related rationales (β = -
.47, p < .01). Thus neither hypothesis H5B, which predicted that decision makers from more 
collectivistic cultures would provide more teamwork-related rationales (compared to those from 
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individualistic cultures), nor hypothesis H5C, which predicted that decision makers from 
individualistic cultures would provide more taskwork-related rationales (compared to those from 
collectivistic cultures), was supported.  
With regard to tie-related rationales, neither the incremental variance explained nor any of 
the independent variables were significant. Thus, hypotheses H4, H5A, and H6, which predicted 
that tie-related rationales would be higher for leaders (compared to selectors), collectivistic 
decision makers (compared to individualistic decision makers), and more role interdependent 
decision makers (compared to less role interdependent decision makers), respectively, were not 
supported. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
If the rationales provided by the decision makers are representative of the factors that they 
considered while selecting team members, then it appears that they consider taskwork-related 
and tie-related factors ahead of teamwork-related factors. That teamwork-related rationales or 
factors appears to be the least salient or important of the three categories is surprising 
considering the lip service paid to it in the scholarly literature on teams in general, and in the 
general literature and discussions on sports teams in particular.  
In keeping with the overall thrust of this dissertation with regard to the relational heuristics in 
team formation, the lack of support for tie-related rationales is surprising, particularly with 
regard to the leader-selector condition variable. The leader-selector condition variable was a 
significant predictor of relational bias in Study 1, leading one to expect a similar relationship 
with tie-related rationales. One explanation for this result is that overall level of tie-related 
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rationales is lower (23%) compared to relational bias (31% to 50%), and therefore there is 
insufficient power to detect differences. Another explanation is that reported rationales as a 
dependent variable are not as directly indicative of relational orientation compared to selection 
decisions.  
The finding that selection rationales are skewed toward taskwork is surprising, and could be 
an artifact of the dataset. Although sports teams have many similarities to work teams, there is an 
important difference that may have impacted the ability to draw meaningful conclusions in this 
study. In sports, the skills and abilities required of team members are not only more clearly 
defined, but also more observable than are those required of team members in organizational 
situations. This could have resulted in an over-focus on skills and abilities at the expense of more 
intangible factors. A total of 58.9% of the rationales were specific to playing soccer (i.e., 
taskwork specific or teamwork specific), and only 18.1% were generic. Similar research in either 
the laboratory or a field setting may help clarify this issue. 
One of the intriguing aspects of this study was the relative lack of teamwork- and team spirit-
related rationales. As mentioned earlier, a decision maker may attempt to ensure teamwork or 
chemistry on his or her team in two ways: (1) by selecting team members on an individual basis 
whose personality and other characteristics would facilitate teamwork, or (2) by selecting team 
members in groups or combinations among whom chemistry or cohesion already exists.  
I had a coder review the entire content and identify all cases in which decision makers 
explicitly selected team members in groups of two or more. Appendix H provides the list of all 
these instances. Out of the 549 selections made by the decision makers in this study, 42 (7.65%) 
selections have been made on this basis. Except for two cases, one in which Lionel Messi 
selected his entire under-20 World Cup team (10 choices), and the other in which Hasan 
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Kachloul selected four German players in combination, the combination selections were at the 
dyadic partnership level. This further underscores the notion that decision makers in this dataset 
appear to be mostly focused on the individual level, occasionally at the dyadic level, and very 
rarely at the subunit or team level. 
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6.0  LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Both datasets in this dissertation can and will be expanded in future work. This will result in 
larger sample sizes and perhaps statistically significant results for some of the relationships that 
currently are only directionally supported. The back page feature of the popular soccer magazine 
FourFourTwo may yield more data points for the soccer player dataset. The NFL dataset is 
amenable to expansion in two directions: prospective and retrospective. First, every year, there is 
a turnover among NFL head coaches, resulting in the appointment of new head coaches, who in 
turn select their first-year coaching staff. Second, all NFL clubs have a printed media guide 
which contains a section entitled, “All Time Coaches,” which lists all the head coaches and 
assistant coaches that have been employed by that club, their tenure of employment, and the job 
title(s) they held during their tenure. Based on these lists, coaching rosters for head coaches can 
be recreated, and if the career data for the individual coaches on the roster are obtainable, then 
the relational ties between the head coach and his assistants can be identified, and the dataset can 
be expanded. 
Both datasets in this dissertation include only male decision makers. Eagly (1987) suggests 
that it is useful to think of gender differences in terms of two qualities: communal (selfless and 
concerned with others), and agentic (self-assertive and motivated to control). Various studies 
(e.g., Rosner, 1990, Werner & LaRussa, 1985) have demonstrated that, in general, females are 
more often characterized by communal qualities, whereas males are more often characterized by 
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agentic qualities. This suggests that female decision makers would have greater relational 
orientation in team formation compared to male decision makers; this could be tested in future 
research. 
Only direct or first-order ties have been considered in this dissertation. During the past 
decade, there has been a dramatic increase in research on how social networks are formed and 
change (e.g., Arrow, 1997; Carley, 1991; Doreian & Stokman, 1997; Fararo & Skvoretz, 1986; 
Friedkin & Johnsen, 2003; Lazer, 2001; Stokman & Berveling, 1998). A more comprehensive 
study is needed to identify the role played by indirect ties, through which friends of friends or 
friends of family members may be selected to the team. The centrality, or otherwise, of the head 
coach in the network of prior relational ties among all members of his team needs to be explored 
in future research. According to Hinds et al. (2000: 246), familiarity alone was not adequate to 
generate a future work tie, but rather depended upon whether the previous experience was 
successful and whether the prior tie was a strong one. The relevance of tie strength and success 
of previous collaborations needs to be investigated in future research. 
The focus in this dissertation was on studying decisions rather than decision-making 
processes. The processes were a “black box” and need to be investigated through other 
methodologies in future research. For instance, in this study, analysis of the rationales cannot 
determine whether the factors considered preceded the selection decisions, or the selection 
decisions were made first, and then justified by the rationales. A laboratory experiment using a 
technique such as protocol analysis could clarify this issue. These issues also need to be explored 
in other contexts such as entrepreneurial teams, project organizations, and intra-organizational 
teams. 
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In recent times, there has been a resurgence of personality theories of leadership. Cannella 
and Monroe (1997) suggest personality theories as one of three alternative perspectives to the 
two dominant perspectives on top managers (agency theory and strategic leadership theory). 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) have recently proposed a narcissistic model of leadership. This 
dissertation belongs to this stream, but does not operationalize personality variables directly. 
Further research that either directly or unobtrusively (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) 
measures personality variables would be useful to develop a more nuanced model of team 
leaders’ approach to member selections.  
Because the biases and heuristics explored in this dissertation are manifestations of cognitive 
miserliness, a promising line of research would be to examine the relationship between 
intelligence (Sternberg, 1997) or cognitive complexity or cognitive capacity (Hooijberg, Hunt, & 
Dodge, 1997) and relational bias in team formation. Individual complexity refers to how 
attentive or sensitive individuals are to information from their surrounding environments and the 
extent to which they require information when making decisions (e.g., Tetlock, 1985). Dyson 
and Preston (2006) found that low-complexity individuals drew almost exclusively from their 
own generational and cultural context, whereas high-complexity individuals drew from a wider 
range of sources. Their results suggest that high-complexity individuals would be less biased in 
their decision making and could be tested in future research. 
A relational or biased approach to team formation could result in two types of errors. A form 
of Type I error could occur when individuals who should be selected are rejected. Also, a form 
of Type II error could occur when individuals who should be rejected are selected. Although it 
was not possible to confirm the extent to which these errors have occurred in the datasets 
analyzed, there was anecdotal evidence of some instances of Type II error in both datasets. In the 
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soccer dataset, Nakamura chose his personal press officer and manager as his goal-keeper, even 
though “in truth, he is not a great goalkeeper, but he is a good friend.” Both Kaka and 
Schweinsteiger chose their brothers, and Kaka chose his father, even though, unlike the rest of 
their choices, these individuals had never played first-division soccer. In the NFL dataset, when 
Art Shell was appointed the head coach of the Oakland Raiders for the 2006 season, he hired as 
his offensive coordinator Tom Walsh, who had been his colleague for 12 years, from 1982 to 
1994. Walsh had neither coached in the NFL since 1994, nor coached at any level of the game 
since 1999, and in fact had spent the previous several years operating a bed-and-breakfast ranch. 
Walsh was demoted from his offensive coordinator role midway through the season, and both he 
and Shell were fired, along with most of their colleagues, at the end of the season. These 
instances illustrate the propensity to prioritize relational ties in both fantasy and real-life teams. 
The extent to which Type II errors could be taking place in team member selections, and their 
impact on team processes and performance, needs to be investigated in the future. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Although recent research has examined the role of social networks or familiarity as 
mechanisms of team formation (e.g., Hinds et al., 2000; Ruef et al., 2003), it has not 
distinguished between teams that are formed through self-selection and those that are formed 
through a search and selection process undertaken by an individual. This dissertation focused on 
the latter, and analyzed archival data of teams formed by individuals to identify the extent to 
which relational ties and factors were evident in their selected teams and selection rationales, 
respectively. The use of archival data to study decision making complements the experimental 
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approach that has traditionally been used in this domain. This dissertation introduces a new 
variable, backing-up subunit, that is the structural counterpart of the backing-up behaviors 
construct (Porter et al., 2003). It also brings renewed focus to the conceptualization of role 
interdependence (Thomas, 1957) that has been relatively neglected. 
The overall conclusion is that leaders’ relational ties play an important role in team 
formation, be they fantasy teams or real-life teams. The mean relational bias to the team was 
50% among leaders in the soccer dataset and 34% in the NFL head coach dataset. Even when 
decision makers were not leaders, but rather selectors in a fantasy context, where they could 
select anyone they wished, even from the past, their relational bias was 31%. These results 
suggest that relational ties are a general heuristic decision makers use in forming teams, and 
resort to even more when they are leaders. These findings need to be tested in other contexts. 
Further, in real-life situations, team leaders’ role interdependence appears to influence their 
relational approach to team formation. NFL head coaches who had greater individual role 
interdependence (e.g., they were from a defensive background) had significantly higher 
relational bias both to their team and to their backing-up subunit, compared to those with lower 
role interdependence. If this result is validated by research in other contexts, it would imply that 
role interdependence is a factor that needs to be considered when selecting team leaders. 
(a) Teams Research 
Although sports teams bear many similarities to work teams, there are also differences that 
may affect generalizability of findings. The findings particularly with regard to the extent of 
relational bias and its relationship with individual role interdependence need to be examined in 
organizational contexts.  
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Moreland (1987) opines that a better understanding of group formation could help to clarify 
many other phenomena that occur in small groups. Future research could examine the 
relationship between relational bias and team processes, particularly in the early stages of group 
formation, and team performance.  
One of the surprising findings from Study 2 was that teamwork-related rationales were not as 
frequently cited as taskwork-related rationales and tie-related rationales. On one hand, this could 
be merely be an artifact of the research design. On the other hand, it could imply that teamwork 
is not as salient a factor in team formation as scholars might expect it to be. And if so, the 
reasons for this relative lack of salience need to be explored. An explanation that could be 
investigated is whether teamwork and related terms such as cohesion and chemistry are too 
amorphous for decision makers to consider. Decision makers’ propensity to select team members 
in combinations to leverage the chemistry that already exists is another avenue for future 
research. Finally, research could examine whether adopting a more teamwork-salient approach to 
team formation has beneficial results in terms of team performance. 
(b) Leadership 
According to the leader-member exchange (LMX) perspective, leaders differentiate among 
those that they lead, favoring some but not others with trust, opportunity, and decision-making 
latitude (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). The trusted subordinates 
are referred to as the leader’s ingroup, in contrast to those whose relationship with the leader 
placed them in the outgroup (Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). One implication of this dissertation is 
that those team members with relational ties to the leader are likely to be in his or her ingroup, 
and future research could examine whether this is true.  
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The leader’s relational bias to the selected team could be a signal of his or her leadership 
style. To return to the political vignette used in the Introduction, with regard to the 2008 U.S. 
Presidential elections, Democratic Presidential nominee Barack Obama has said that his 
approach to choosing his running mate would be a signal of his leadership style. Leadership style 
is one of the oldest and most enduring aspects of the leadership literature (Blau & Scott, 1962; 
Fiedler, 1967; Likert, 1961). One of the typical ways of parsing leadership styles is in terms of a 
continuum moving from “autocratic” or “boss centered” at one end to “democratic” or 
“employee centered” at the other (Delbecq, 1964). In a similar vein, Schreiber and Carley 
(2006), following Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), define leadership style by how decisions are 
made in the organization, i.e., directive or participative. Hill (1973) delineates four styles defined 
by varying emphasis on task and interpersonal orientations. Future research could identify 
leaders’ member selection styles, and examine whether they are related to their leadership styles. 
For instance, if a team leader selects the same team members for project after project, it may 
imply that he or she values their contribution, and involves them in decision making, implying a 
more participative leadership style. Conversely, a team leader with a more directive leadership 
style may only require the team members to perform their roles, and may therefore adopt a more 
open search process based on skills and competencies and less influenced by relational ties. 
The attempt to delineate member selection styles is similar to research on cognitive styles. 
Tetlock’s (2000) found that cognitive style was one of two consistent predictors of how 
managers interpreted decisions at three levels of analysis. Cognitive style has been defined as an 
individual’s preferred and habitual approach to organizing, representing, and processing 
information (Streufert & Nogami, 1989). It is widely recognized as an important determinant of 
individual behavior in the psychology literature (Sadler-Smith & Badger, 1998). To what extent 
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leaders have a member selection style and its relationship with their cognitive style are areas for 
future exploration. 
(c) Strategic Management 
With regard to strategic management, the finding that internal promotees to leadership 
positions are significantly higher in terms of relational bias compared to external hires has 
implications for CEO appointment. Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996: 940-941) suggest that “New 
CEOs who do not simultaneously initiate changes in their teams will be dependent on their 
team’s current competence, procedures, and cognitive frames” (e.g., Ancona, 1989; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992).  
The key advantages of making a sweeping change in the executive team are that it can shift 
the team’s competence base and increase its heterogeneity of experiences which form the basis 
for experimentation (O’Reilly & Flatt, 1989; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990). However, 
considering that the mean relational bias was 50% in the leader condition of the soccer dataset, 
and 34% in the NFL head coach dataset, and these are underestimates because of the approach 
taken in this dissertation, the extent of heterogeneity of experience may not be as high as 
scholars might expect. More direct testing of the extent of relational bias in new CEOs’ 
executive teams and its impact on strategy is needed (see Beckman, 2006 for a paper in this 
domain). If indeed new CEOs have a high degree of relational bias to their executive teams, then 
the driver for making the sweeping changes may not be a strategic decision to encourage 
exploration (March, 1991) and experimentation, but rather a political move on the part of the 
CEO. As Greiner and Bhambri (1989) point out, CEOs who do not initiate executive team 
change may be held hostage to the team’s existing political equilibrium.   
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(d) Entrepreneurship 
Although the importance of the individuals who create organizations has long been 
appreciated, scholarship that focuses on the entrepreneurial team is just developing (Forbes et al., 
2006). According to Simon, Houghton, and Aquino (1999), entrepreneurs may be particularly 
prone to biases (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Shaver & Scott, 1991) because they unintentionally 
simplify their information processing to diminish the stress and ambiguity associated with the 
decision to start ventures (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Hansen & Allen, 1992). Although the 
importance of relational ties to the formation of entrepreneurial teams is well established (e.g., 
Francis & Sandberg, 2000; Kamm & Nurick, 1993), this dissertation suggests that the 
background of the entrepreneur, particularly with regard to individual role interdependence, is an 
important factor. This dissertation suggests that entrepreneurs who have typically had greater 
role interdependence in their past will have higher relational bias both to their teams and to their 
backing-up subunits. The questions that need to be explored include what would be appropriate 
operationalizations of individual role interdependence and backing-up subunits in an 
entrepreneurial context, whether similar results would be obtained, and what would be the 
implications of the findings for new venture performance. 
Cognition in entrepreneurship has been studied under a variety of terms, such as 
“entrepreneurial intentions” (Bird, 1988), “entrepreneurial intuition” (Mitchell, Friga, & 
Mitchell, 2005), and “owner-managers’ cognitive style” (Brigham, De Castro, & Shepherd, 
2007). Future research could examine the relationship between the aforementioned constructs 
and the entrepreneur’s relational bias to team formation.   
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF SOCCER PLAYERS IN DATASET 1 
 Sr.No. Pl_name Nationality Sr_No Pl_name Nationality
1 Franz Beckenbauer Germany 29 Radhi Jaidi Tunisia
2 Alessandro Nesta Italy 30 Mario Melchiot Netherlands
3 Michel Ballack Germany 31 Michael Reiziger Netherlands
4 Bastian Schweinsteiger Germany 32 Jaap Stam Netherlands
5 David Beckham England 33 Ramon Vega Switzerland
6 Steven Gerrard England 34 Marc Bircham Canada
7 Mark van Bommel Netherlands 35 George Boateng Netherlands
8 Arjen Robben Netherlands 36 Ronald de Boer Netherlands
9 Patrick Vieira France 37 Giovanni van Bronckhorst Netherlands
10 Zinedine Zidane France 38 Phillip Cocu Netherlands
11 Kaka Brazil 39 Ryan Giggs Wales
12 Juan Roman Riquelme Argentina 40 Alf-Inge Haaland Norway
13 Xavi Spain 41 Don Hutchison Scotland
14 Xabi Alonso Spain 42 Hassan Kachloul Morocco
15 Shunshuke Nakamura Japan 43 Richard Langley Jamaica
16 Tranquillo Barnetta Switzerland 44 Marc Overmars Netherlands
17 Raul Spain 45 Steven Reid Ireland
18 Henrik Larsson Sweden 46 Gary Speed Wales
19 Lionel Messi Argentina 47 Joseph-Desire Job Cameroon
20 Lukas Podolski Germany 48 Patrick Kluivert Netherlands
21 Simao Sabrosa Portugal 49 Lomana LuaLua Congo
22 David Trezeguet France 50 Shaun Maloney Scotland
23 Jerzy Dudek Poland 51 Pavel Nedved Czech Rep
24 Dean Kiely Ireland 52 Petr Cech Czech Rep
25 Antti Niemi Finland 53 Gheorghe Hagi Romania
26 Winston Bogarde Netherlands 54 Jamie Carragher England
27 Frank de Boer Netherlands 55 Geoff Hurst England
28 Vegard Heggem Norway 56 Rodney Marsh England
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF NFL HEAD COACHES IN DATASET 2 
Sr.No. Head Coach Club Year Sr.No. Head Coach Club Year
1 Al Groh New York Jets 2000 41 Jimmie Johnson Dallas Cowboys 1989
2 Andy Reid Philadelphia Eagles 1999 42 Joe Gibbs Washington Redskins 2004
3 Art Shell Oakland Raiders 2006 43 John Fox Carolina Panthers 2002
4 Barry Switzer Dallas Cowboys 1994 44 John Harbaugh Baltimore Ravens 2008
5 Bill Belichick New England Patriots 2000 45 Jon Gruden Tampa Bay Buccaneers 2002
6 Bill Callahan Oakland Raiders 2002 46 Ken Whisenhunt Arizona Cardinals 2007
7 Bill Cowher Pittsburgh Steelers 1992 47 Kevin Gilbride San Diego Chargers 1997
8 Bill Parcells Dallas Cowboys 2003 48 Lane Kiffin Oakland Raiders 2007
9 Bobby Petrino Atlanta Falcons 2007 49 Lovie Smith Chicago Bears 2004
10 Bobby Ross Detroit Loins 1997 50 Marty Mornhinweg Detroit Loins 2001
11 Brad Childress Minnesota Vikings 2006 51 Marty Schottenheimer San Diego Chargers 2002
12 Brian Billick Baltimore Ravens 1999 52 Marvin Lewis Cincinnati Bengals 2003
13 Bruce Coslet Cincinnati Bengals 1997 53 Mike Ditka New Orleans Saints 1997
14 Butch Davis Cleveland Browns 2001 54 Mike Holmgren Seattle Seahawks 1999
15 Cam Cameron Miami Dolphins 2007 55 Mike McCarthy Green Bay Packers 2006
16 Chan Gailey Dallas Cowboys 1998 56 Mike Mularkey Buffalo Bills 2004
17 Chris Palmer Cleveland Browns 1999 57 Mike Nolan San Francisco 49ers 2005
18 Dan Reeves Atlanta Falcons 1997 58 Mike Riley San Diego Chargers 1999
19 Dave Campo Dallas Cowboys 2000 59 Mike Shanahan Denver Broncos 1995
20 Dave McGinnis Arizona Cardinals 2001 60 Mike Sherman Green Bay Packers 2000
21 Dave Shula Cincinnati Bengals 1992 61 Mike Smith Atlanta Falcons 2008
22 Dennis Erickson Seattle Seahawks 1995 62 Mike Tice Minnesota Vikings 2002
23 Dennis Green Arizona Cardinals 2004 63 Mike Tomlin Pittsburgh Steelers 2007
24 Dick Jauron Buffalo Bills 2006 64 Mike White Oakland Raiders 1995
25 Dick LeBeau Cincinnati Bengals 2001 65 Nick Saban Miami Dolphins 2005
26 Dick Vermeil Kansas City Chiefs 2001 66 Norv Turner San Diego Chargers 2007
27 Dom Capers Houston Texans 2002 67 Pete Carroll New England Patriots 1997
28 Eric Mangini New York Jets 2006 68 Ray Rhodes Green Bay Packers 1999
29 Gary Kubiak Houston Texans 2006 69 Rod Marinelli Detroit Loins 2006
30 George Seifert Carolina Panthers 1999 70 Romeo Crennel Cleveland Browns 2005
31 Gregg Williams Buffalo Bills 2001 71 Scott Linehan Saint Louis Rams 2006
32 Gunther Cunningham Kansas City Chiefs 1999 72 Sean Payton New Orleans Saints 2006
33 Herm Edwards Kansas City Chiefs 2006 73 Steve Mariucci Detroit Loins 2003
34 Jack Del Rio Jacksonville Jaguars 2003 74 Steve Spurrier Washington Redskins 2002
35 Jeff Fisher Tennessee Titans 1995 75 Tom Coughlin New York Giants 2004
36 Jim E. Mora Indianapolis Colts 1998 76 Tom Flores Seattle Seahawks 1992
37 Jim Fassel New York Giants 1997 77 Tony Dungy Indianapolis Colts 2002
38 Jim Haslett New Orleans Saints 2000 78 Tony Sparano Miami Dolphins 2008
39 Jim Mora Jr. Atlanta Falcons 2004 79 Wade Phillips Dallas Cowboys 2007
40 Jim Zorn Washington Redskins 2008  
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SUMMARY – COACH KEN WHISENHUNT 
This telephone interview was conducted by Jonathan Pinto and Richard Herko, April 8, 
2008, 3.10–3.30 p.m.  Mr. Whisenhunt’s responses are summarized. 
 
How he went about filling up his coaching staff: 
Over his years as a player and assistant coach, he had been making a list of people he 
thought would make good coaches or who were already position coaches that he would hire if he 
became head coach. By the time he interviewed for a head coaching job, he had a list that was 
three people deep for every position. 
 
He hired the offensive and defensive coordinators first and then hired the rest of the 
coaching staff in conjunction with them. 
 
There are two types of assistant coaches: (1) those who are under contract, and (2) free 
agents, whose contracts are expired, or have been fired; there is usually competition to get them. 
 
This list of prospective coaches was important because it was a factor in his selection as 
head coach. The Arizona Cardinals management wanted to see whom he would bring in as 
assistant coaches and the quality of his coaching staff. 
 
The factors that led him to put coaches on this short list were the coaches’ ability to 
communicate and to be a good teacher. If a particular coach was not available because he was 
under contract, then Whisenhunt would go to the next person on his depth chart. He got someone 
from his depth chart for all his coaching staff positions. 
 
“You hire who you know.” If you don’t know them directly, you take the opinion of 
someone you trust. For instance, Whisenhunt would take the counsel of Dan Henning for a 
recommendation of a position coach. Henning drafted him out of college, was his head coach 
with the Atlanta Falcons, and knows him and his coaching style. 
 
What other factors would contribute to a coach making the short list or being hired: 
Background is a factor—both playing and coaching background. Just like in any other 
profession, your background says a lot about you. 
 
Events like the “Combine” (where the NFL owners and coaches evaluate the NCAA 
players) are very much like interviews, because you get to meet other coaches and talk with 
them.  
 
The importance of the “coaching scheme”: 
This is very important for him. For instance, he wanted to hire a wide receivers coach 
from Philadelphia, but that person was specialized in the West Coast-style offense, which is not 
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what Whisenhunt favors. He felt that he would have to spend too much time to help the position 
coach learn his scheme. 
 
How important creativity and flexibility are to him, particularly since he is known 
throughout the American football world for his “gadget plays”: 
Flexibility is very important to him because coaches have to adapt their schemes to the 
players that they have. With the Pittsburgh Steelers, the offensive coaches had to customize their 
tactics to suit the talents of Hines Ward, the Steelers veteran wide receiver. 
 
He felt that all coaches were creative and the gadget plays were not particular to him.  
 
What influence the general manager or the owners had over his coaching staff decisions: 
While that sometimes happens with other organizations, in this case he had complete 
authority. In fact, the GM and the owners did not even interview the candidates. They might 
have seen or met them, but did not formally interview them. 
 
He did allow that other teams handle this situation very differently and he was aware of 
teams where the owner or the GM had input into the hiring of individual coaches. 
 
Whether he got a capped budget for his coaching staff or a fixed number of positions: 
He got approval for a fixed number of positions, and then the compensation for each 
assistant coach was individually negotiated. 
 
The extent to which head coaches release their assistants for jobs: 
By NFL rules, no one can stop someone from being interviewed for a head coaching job. 
And usually, if the assistant coach is advancing in his career, the head coach will not stand in the 
way, e.g., for a coordinator position. But if it is a lateral move, the organization may block the 
process. For instance, he wanted to hire the tight ends coach from the Pittsburgh Steelers, but the 
Steelers refused permission since it was a lateral move. Typically, assistant coaches are on a two-
year contract. 
 
Whether he keeps updating his short list of assistant coaches: 
Yes, not so much to upgrade his coaching staff, but to prepare for inevitable turnover. 
One of his assistants was being interviewed for the Miami Dolphins head coaching job, so he 
always has to be prepared. 
 
Whether other coaches have a similar short list approach to hiring: 
Probably everyone who is in the running for a head coach job has a similar list. He could not 
think of anyone who did not have such an approach, though, just like there is variation in 
“schemes,” there must be some variety in approaches. 
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APPENDIX D: MEETING SUMMARY - DAN ROONEY 
The interview was conducted by Jonathan Pinto, March 4, 2008, 11.45 a.m.–1 p.m., 
Pittsburgh Steelers Training Facility, 3400 South Water Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15203. 
 
We always hire for the long term, while other teams will fire a coach after two or three 
seasons if the coach does not win it all. Therefore, for us, having a process to select the head 
coach is very important. Once you hire a head coach, you give him the tools he needs to do the 
job, and the coaching staff is one of those tools. The head coach has complete authority to 
choose his coaching staff. I tell the head coach that I am here to help you, if you need my help. 
He tells us who he wants to call for an interview. We meet with the hires to give our inputs, and 
we tell him the pluses and minuses that we have heard about the people on the list, what are their 
assets, and what information he may need to ferret out to address areas of concern. In case we 
have heard something negative about the person that cannot be fixed (e.g., dishonesty), then we 
let the head coach know. If it is a negative that can be fixed (e.g., the potential assistant coach 
has a bad personality), then we tell the head coach that that is something he would have to deal 
with, if he wound up hiring the person.  
 
When I was looking for a head coach, I compiled a list of potential head coach hires from 
my knowledge, from what I had heard, and from talking to people. Then I make calls to people 
on the list and whittle down the list based on whether the person is interested in the job, and 
other information that can be gleaned through a telephonic interview. You can get a lot of 
information from a telephonic interview. Sometimes you interview people because an important 
friend asks you to. So you end up with a short list of five to seven people. Once a short list is 
prepared, it is important that you meet everyone and not jump to a decision after the first or 
second person has been interviewed (because sometimes the interviewers themselves get bored 
with the process). It is important to meet potential head coach hires multiple times before a final 
decision is made. It is also important to meet the head coach’s wife and see the relationship 
between them. The process we follow is similar to that done in academia when they are hiring a 
dean. 
 
We don’t look for someone with an offensive background or defensive background. He is 
the head coach of the entire team, and that goes beyond just offense or defense. Sometimes other 
teams, when they have been losing with a head coach from a defensive background, will hire 
someone from an offensive background thinking that that will solve the problem. 
 
“The system” is not that important for us. We hired a head coach from a 4-3 system even 
though we are a 3-4 system, because we expect them to be able to work it out among themselves. 
And they do. And sometimes you could go 3-4 on third down and 4-3 on first down. What Mike 
Tomlin said about Xs and Os being overrated is correct, because no one hires based on that. That 
is basic knowledge that is taken for granted at this level. 
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What all coaches tend to do, however, is to change the jargon. When a receiver ran a 
straight route it used to be called a “take-off,” but now they call it something else. Each one has 
his own jargon. And they keep changing it. They say it is so that the linemen don’t catch on to 
their play calls. 
 
Some coaches have a long list of plays. But I don’t think having a very long list of plays 
is useful. Some coaches believe in scripting the first 15 plays. But sometimes the play you 
scheduled for #15 might have to be play #2 depending on the situation you are faced with. Once 
I was talking to Bill Walsh, the famous coach, and he said that his scripting never worked against 
the Steelers. He said everyone ran the routes they were supposed to run, but the quarterback was 
flat on his back and that was not in the script! 
 
The head coach is an administrator. We sometimes give him someone to help him ensure 
that people show up on time for meetings and so on, so that he does not get caught up in 
minutiae. Because he has to be the leader, with the whole pyramidical structure under him. 
 
Sometimes people say that coaches should not have a gruff style (e.g., Vince Lombardi, 
Chuck Noll), but that is not as important as whether the players respect them or not. When 
Chuck Noll called his first meeting, he told the team, “I have been watching film of you guys 
playing, and you are all nice guys, but you are not good at football.” And indeed, some of them 
were cut shortly thereafter. 
 
The most important thing is that the coach has to be true to himself. If he tries to be 
something that he is not, the players pick up on it, and it will not work. 
 
Mike Tomlin had to work more with the special teams this past year than is typical, 
because that unit had not been performing well. But in general, he would work with all the units 
in rotation, one day special teams, the next day offense, and on the third day defense. 
 
With regard to compensation, we give the head coach the total amount that he can spend 
on his coaching staff, then it is up to him how he chooses to divide up the pie among his 
coaching staff. There are performance-linked incentives, of course. 
 
During the season, the coaches work seven days a week. They get a week off, 
immediately after the end of the season. Then during the off-season, they usually work five days 
a week. They also get around six weeks off, typically from the middle of June to the end of July, 
just before training camp. During the pre-season, they study film, but not as much as during the 
regular season. 
 
Sometimes young, new head coaches have to hire people they know from before, because 
others are not willing to take the risk to join them. They expect new coaches, especially if they 
are young, and we have been hiring young head coaches, to get fired quickly, and they don’t 
want to risk their jobs. It should be different with coaching jobs at the Steelers because they 
know that we hire for the long term. However, this happened to us one time, many years ago, 
when Chuck Noll was our head coach. This guy joined us, and then got an offer from someone 
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else, and left us to go there. Chuck Noll stayed our coach for 20 years, while the guy he joined 
got fired in four years. 
 
Head coaches don’t necessarily hire people from their personal contacts in the unit in 
which they have a background, such as offense or defense. Like I said, it depends on who is 
willing to join them. Also, by the time the head coach is hired, around six weeks have already 
elapsed since the end of the season, and a lot of the assistant coaches are already hired away and 
not available. Thus, the biggest advantage of hiring a head coach quickly is that he is able to get 
the pick of the assistants. 
 
But having said that, Mike Tomlin did what you are suggesting might be happening. He 
kept the defense coaching staff intact and brought in people on offense.  
 
The concept of coaching staff has evolved over time. In the old days, the head coach 
himself was part time, and had to take up another job (like a day job) in the off-season. Then it 
evolved to three coaches: head coach, offense, and defense. Then it evolved to 10 coaches and 
stayed that way for a while: offense (coordinator, running backs, receivers, offensive line, 
quarterbacks), defense (defensive line, linebackers, and defensive backs), and a special teams 
coach, plus a head coach. Nowadays, there is even greater specialization, resulting in a coaching 
staff of around 15-18. For instance, we have two special teams coaches—one for returns, and the 
other for kicking. We also have a separate tight ends coach from a receivers coach. Plus, you 
have a weight guy (i.e., strength and conditioning), and some guys who help break down film 
(assistants or quality control). We have had a coach who has been here for a long time, John 
Mitchell, who we have given the designation of assistant head coach, to reflect his seniority, but 
it is the designation “coordinator” that is really important. 
 
Comments from Bob Labriola, Steelers PR head and writer of the “Steelers Digest” on 
the Steelers Web site (over lunch with Mr. Rooney in the Steelers cafeteria): 
 
[When told by Mr. Rooney about the topic of this dissertation:] Are you studying the 
head coach’s assistant coach selections when they do it right or when they get it wrong? 
Deciding the best approach to selecting assistants is tricky because sometimes going with the 
personal contacts is a good idea, and sometimes it is not. Sometimes your brother is the best guy 
for the job, but if you are just going with someone because of a promise you made to him when 
you were both cleaning out lockers, then that is leader-related. 
 
Head coaches tend to be very egocentric. They want to go with their own system because of their 
egos. They tend not to want to adapt to the team they are facing that particular week. Now, 
Belichick did not have an ego with regard to changing up his tactics from week to week, but he 
had an ego with regard to his approach, i.e., the spying, despite being told not to do so by the 
authorities. 
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APPENDIX E: MEDIA REPORT OF COACH TOMLIN’S RELATIONAL TIES 
 
Tomlin locks in first staff 
By Kevin Gorman 
TRIBUNE-REVIEW 
Tuesday, January 30, 2007  
Mike Tomlin put a personal stamp on his first coaching staff Monday, when the Steelers 
announced two promotions and the hirings of six assistants, including five who have worked in 
close proximity with Tomlin.  
Bruce Arians was officially promoted from receivers coach to offensive coordinator to replace 
Ken Whisenhunt, now the head coach of the Arizona Cardinals.  
Ray Horton was named defensive backs coach after spending three years as assistant to 
Darren Perry, who was not retained. Horton coached for the Cincinnati Bengals when Tomlin 
worked at the University of Cincinnati.  
Ken Anderson (quarterbacks), Randy Fichtner (receivers), Bob Ligashesky (special teams), 
Kirby Wilson (running backs), Larry Zierlein (offensive line) and Amos Jones (assistant special 
teams) also joined Tomlin's staff, lending a veteran presence to the 34-year-old head coach's 
first season.  
"I think we have put together a staff of good people who are also good football coaches," Tomlin 
said in a statement. "They are all good communicators who will help make sure our players 
understand exactly what is expected of them. I look forward to working with them all on a daily 
basis."  
Here is a look at the additions:  
• Anderson, 57, spent the past four seasons with the Jacksonville Jaguars, where he was 
quarterbacks coach. He also handled the receivers for one season (2003). Anderson played 16 
seasons for the Cincinnati Bengals and spent 10 as their quarterbacks coach, including five as 
offensive coordinator. Anderson was the Bengals' offensive coordinator while Tomlin coached at 
the University of Cincinnati. Anderson replaces Mark Whipple.  
• Fichtner, 43, spent the past six seasons as offensive coordinator/quarterbacks coach at the 
University of Memphis. He was offensive coordinator at Arkansas State in 1997-98, when 
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Tomlin was an assistant there. Fichtner also coached at Purdue, Michigan, Southern Cal and 
UNLV.  
• Ligashesky, 44, is a McKees Rocks native and Indiana (Pa.) graduate who coached tight ends 
and was special teams coordinator at Pitt from 2000-03. Ligashesky spent the past two seasons 
with the St. Louis Rams after a year as assistant special teams coach with Jacksonville. He met 
Tomlin through Tampa Bay special teams coach Richard Bisaccia, a longtime friend. 
Ligashesky replaces Kevin Spencer, who joined Whisenhunt's staff.  
• Wilson, 45, spent the past three seasons with the Arizona Cardinals. He coached with Tomlin 
in Tampa Bay (2002-03) after stints with the Washington Redskins and New England Patriots. 
He replaces Dick Hoak, who retired.  
• Zierlein, 61, spent last season with the Buffalo Bills after five seasons with the Cleveland 
Browns, where Arians was formerly the offensive coordinator. Zierlein also has an extensive 
college coaching history, coaching at Cincinnati from 1997-2000, when Tomlin was an assistant 
there, as well as Tulane, Louisiana State and Houston. He replaces Russ Grimm, who joined 
Whisenhunt's staff.  
• Jones, 47, spent the past three seasons coaching special teams/outside linebackers at 
Mississippi State. He also coached at Cincinnati when Tomlin was there, from 1999-2002, and 
had stops at James Madison, Alabama, Temple (from 1986-88, when Arians was the Owls' 






APPENDIX F: INITIAL CODING FRAMEWORK 
1) Task Related 
a) Generic 
i) Physical predictors, e.g., height, weight, body size (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Williams 
& Reilly, 2000) 
ii) Physiological conditioning, e.g., aerobic capacity, anaerobic endurance, speed, 
stamina, agility, flexibility (Jeffrey, 1935; Coerver, 1983; Luxbacher, 1991; Williams 
& Reilly, 2000) 
b) Specific 
i) Ball control/ Psychomotor skills, e.g., passing, receiving, shooting, heading skills 
(Abbott & Collins, 2004; Jeffrey, 1935; Coerver, 1983; Luxbacher, 1991) 
ii) Dominating the opponent, e.g., receiving, dribbling (Coerver, 1983) 
iii) Creating and using chances, e.g., shooting, heading (Coerver, 1983) 
iv) Defensive qualities, e.g., sliding tackles (Coerver, 1983) 
 
2) Teamwork Related 
a) Generic 
i) Personality, e.g., self-confidence, anxiety control, motivation, aggressiveness 
(Jeffrey, 1935; Williams & Reilly, 2000) 
ii) Constructive teamwork, e.g., unselfish playing with cooperative effort (Jeffrey, 1935) 
iii) Sociological predictors, e.g., parental support, education, cultural background 
(Williams & Reilly, 2000) 
b) Specific 
i) Deceptive tactics, e.g., field vision (Jeffrey, 1935) 
ii) Beating/bypassing opponents (Coerver, 1983) 
iii) Moving with and without the ball (Coerver, 1983) 
iv) Perceptual-cognitive/conceptual skills, e.g., attention, anticipation, game intelligence, 
decision making, creative thinking (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Williams & Reilly, 
2000) 
v) Psychomotor strategies, e.g., principles of attack and defense (Luxbacher, 1991) 
vi) Psychosocial concepts, i.e., reading the game (Luxbacher, 1991) 
vii) Psychobehavioral elements, e.g., goal setting, realistic performance evaluation 
(Abbott & Collins, 2004) 
 
3) Leader Related 
a) Relational ties (e.g., teammate, opponent) 
b) Affinity ties (e.g., favorite club) 
c) Miscellaneous (e.g., share a birthday, hairstyle) 
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APPENDIX G: FINAL CODING SCHEME 
1) Task-Related 
 
a) Generic (TK-GEN) 
i) Physical Attributes, e.g., height, weight, body size 
ii) Conditioning, e.g., endurance, speed, stamina, agility, flexibility 
 
b) Specific (TK-SPEC) 
i) Ball skills, e.g., passing, receiving, shooting, heading skills, dribbling, sliding tackles, 
free kicks, corner kicks, shot-stopper 
ii) Flair player/ stylish player, Skillful player, Technique 
iii) Best player/ won awards 




a) Generic (TW-GEN) 
i) PER: Personality, e.g., self-confidence, anxiety control, motivation, aggressiveness, 
strength to never give up and never lose hope 
ii) SPRT: Team spirit, e.g., unselfish playing with cooperative effort, leader of the team 
 
b) Specific (TW-SPEC) 
i) Field vision, ability to see/read the game, moving without the ball, anticipation, game 
intelligence, decision making, creativity, versatility, defends as well as attacks 
 
3) Tie-Related (TIE) 
 
a) Former teammate, former colleague 
b) Family member 
c) Same nationality 
d) Member of my favorite club, 
e) Met socially 
f) Childhood hero 
g) Miscellaneous (e.g., share a birthday, like hairstyle) 
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APPENDIX H: TEAM MEMBERS SELECTED IN COMBINATION 
Lionel Messi: So I’m going to go for the team I played in that won the U-20 World Cup 
last year in Holland. . . . [A]t the back, I would have Ezequiel Garay, Gabriel Paletta, Gustavo 
Cabral and Lautaro Formica.  Those four guys make up a great defensive line which is always 
really solid and very difficult to break through.  In midfield, just like in the U-20 tournament, I 
would have Fernando Gago, Rodrigo Archubi and Pablo Zabaleta, all excellent players. 
 
Juan Roman Riquelme: [A]head of us would be my strikers: Gabriel Batistuta and 
Claudio Caniggia.  I would have them because it was always really beautiful to see the two of 
them playing together. Batistuta was the best striker of the 90s, no doubt about that. He came 
from nowhere and scored goals like no other; I admire him a lot.  Caniggia, on the other hand, 
was the sort of player who would maybe only appear at some matches, but he had so many 
spectacular moments. 
 
Simao Sabrosa: My centre-halves would be the Chelsea pair John Terry and Ricardo 
Carvalho.  They are both good players who complement each other well and, in defensive terms, 
no-one else can beat them. 
 
Ryan Giggs: Steve Bruce/Jaap Stam: I’ve got to go for Brucey.  He would complement 
Jaap really well in the heart of defence. 
 
Radhi Jaidi: Thierry Henry/Ziad Jaziri: A perfect foil for Henry, he [Jaziri] represents the 
final piece of the jigsaw for my fantasy XI. 
 
Hassan Kachloul: Harald Schumacher, Franz Beckenbauer, Paul Breitner and Karl-
Heinz Rummenigge: Another German, but all great teams have a great spine and Schumacher, 
Beckenbauer, Breitner and Rummenigge certainly give mine that. 
 
Dean Kiely: Robbie Keane/Niall Quinn: He [Keane]’s a great player and would form a 
perfect little and large partnership with Niall upfront. 
 
Lomana LuaLua: Sol Campbell/Rio Ferdinand: He [Campbell] might not be as composed 
on the ball as Ferdinand but the pair really complement each other when they play for England. 
Zinedine Zidane/Patrick Vieira: He doesn’t attack as much as Zidane but those two would be a 
great combination.  Vieira is a fantastic tackler and does things simply. 
 
Antti Niemi: Chris Marsden/Wayne Bridge: His [Marsden’s] partnership with Wayne 
Bridge down the left-hand side for Southampton was different class and I’d like to see it 
replicated in this team! Kevin Phillips/James Beattie: [Phillips is] the perfect foil for James 
Beattie and together they used to cause havoc for other teams. 
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Marc Overmars: Steve Bould/Ronald Koeman: I think that next to a player like Bouldie it 
would be great to have Koeman, as it would be a great combination. 
 
Gary Speed: Ian Wright/Alan Shearer: Wrighty’s always been a great character in the 
game and he’s a natural goalscorer.  So by picking Wright and Shearer, that means I’ve got a 
quick striker and a slow one up front in my Premiership Fantasy XI. 
 
Jaap Stam: Adri van Tiggelen/Frank] Rijkaard:  He [van Tiggelen] would complement 
Rijkaard really well in central defence as Rijkaard could bring the ball out and van Tiggelen 
would stop the forwards. Edgar Davids/Roy Keane: What an awesome midfield Edgar and Roy 
would make.  I wouldn’t fancy anyone’s chances of getting past them.  Edgar is more of a 
holding, defensive midfielder, so it would give Roy more of a license to push up and support the 
attackers. Dennis Bergkamp/Marco van Basten: Dennis would be the perfect foil for Marco.  I 
would love to see them playing as a partnership—Dennis could thread the ball through for Marco 
to run on to.   I have no idea how defences would stop them.  
 
Ramon Vega: Raul/Christian Vieri: He [Vieri] has the ability to score plenty of goals and 
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